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Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), which combines community investments with reform minded charter
schools, is one of the most ambitious social experiments to alleviate poverty of our time. We provide
the first empirical test of the causal impact of HCZ on educational outcomes, with an eye toward informing
the long-standing debate whether schools alone can eliminate the achievement gap or whether the
issues that poor children bring to school are too much for educators alone to overcome. Both lottery
and instrumental variable identification strategies lead us to the same story: Harlem Children’s Zone
is effective at increasing the achievement of the poorest minority children. Taken at face value, the
effects in middle school are enough to close the black-white achievement gap in mathematics and
reduce it by nearly half in English Language Arts.  The effects in elementary school close the racial
achievement gap in both subjects. We conclude by presenting four pieces of evidence that high-quality
schools or high-quality schools coupled with community investments generate the achievement gains.
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At nine months old, there are no detectable cognitive differences between black and white babies 
(Fryer and Levitt, forthcoming).  Differences emerge as early as age two, and by the time black children 
enter kindergarten they are lagging whites by 0.64 standard deviations in math and 0.401 in reading 
(Fryer and Levitt, 2004).
1 On every subject at every grade level, there are large achievement differences 
between blacks and whites that continue to grow as children progress through school (Campbell, Hombo, 
and Mazzeo, 2000; Neal, 2006).
2 Even accounting for a host of background factors, the achievement gap 
remains large and statistically significant (Jencks and Phillips, 1998).
3 
There have been many attempts to close the achievement gap. Early childhood interventions such 
as Head Start, Nurse-Family Partnership, and the Abecedarian Project boost kindergarten readiness, but 
the effects on achievement often fade once children enter school (Currie and Thomas, 1995; Krueger and 
Whitmore, 2001; Anderson, 2008).
4  More aggressive strategies that place disadvantaged students in 
better schools through busing (Angrist and Lang, 2004) and school choice plans (Rouse, 1998; Krueger 
and Zhu, 2002; Cullen et al., 2005; Hastings et al., 2006), have also left the racial achievement gap 
essentially unchanged.
5 There are several successful charter schools and charter-management 
organizations, but the bulk of the evidence finds only modest success (Hanushek et al., 2005; Hoxby and 
Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby and Murarka, 2009).
6  
School districts have tried an array of strategies to close the achievement gap, including smaller 
schools and classrooms (Achilles et al., 1993; Nye et al., 1995; Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 
2001; Jepsen and Rivkin, 2002), mandatory summer school (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004) merit pay for 
principals, teachers and students (Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Fryer, 2009a, 2009b), after-school 
 
1Early measures of math and reading achievement are more accurately described as measures of math and reading 
readiness.  The ECLS-K reading test, for example, includes questions designed to measure basic skills (print 
familiarity, letter and word recognition, beginning and ending sounds, and rhyming sounds), vocabulary, listening 
and reading comprehension, knowledge of the alphabet, phonetics, and so on.  The math test evaluates number 
recognition, counting, comparing and ordering numbers, solving word problems, and interpreting picture graphs. 
2This fact was first established by Coleman et al. (1966). For more recent analysis, see Campbell et al. (2000), 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Fryer and Levitt (2004, 2006), Neal (2006), or Phillips et al., (1998). 
3
4 There is some evidence that Head Start, Perry Preschool and Nurse-Family Partnership may have positive long-
term impacts on outcomes such as crime, high-school graduation, and labor-market outcomes (Currie and Thomas, 
000; Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Olds, 2006; Deming, 2009). 
Approximately two-thirds of the achievement gap cannot be explained by background characteristics. 
2
5 In a recent review of education policy focused on poor children, Jacob and Ludwig (2008) find that targeted 
investment in early childhood education, smaller class sizes, and bonuses for teachers in hard-to-staff schools all 
pass a cost-benefit analysis, but are unlikely to eliminate the racial and social class disparities in education outcomes 
y themselves.  b
6 Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) is a notable exception, finding that students enrolled in oversubscribed Boston charter 
schools with organized lottery files gain about 0.17 standard deviations per year in ELA and 0.53 standard 
deviations per year in math. However, the typical middle school applicant in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) starts 
0.173 and 0.277 standard deviations higher in fourth grade math and reading than the typical Boston student, and the 
typical high school applicant starts 0.089 and 0.179 standard deviations higher in eighth grade math and reading 
tests.  It is unclear whether average or below average students are as well served by the charter schools considered in 
the study.   2
                                                
programs (Lauer et al., 2006; Redd et al., 2002), budget, curricula, and assessment reorganization 
(Borman and Hewes, 2003; Borman et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2000), and policies to lower the barrier to 
teaching via alternative paths to accreditation (Decker et al., 2004; Kane et al., 2008).  These programs 
have thus far been unable to substantially reduce the achievement gap in even the most reform-minded of 
districts.  
  The lack of progress has fed into a long-standing and rancorous debate among scholars, 
policymakers, and practitioners as to whether schools alone can close the achievement gap, or whether the 
issues children bring to school as a result of being reared in poverty are too much for even the best 
educators to overcome.
7 Proponents of the school-centered approach refer to anecdotes of excellence in 
particular schools or examples of other countries where poor children in superior schools outperform 
average Americans (Chenoweth, 2007). Advocates of the community-focused approach argue that 
teachers and school administrators are dealing with issues that actually originate outside the classroom, 
citing research that shows racial and socioeconomic achievement gaps are formed before children ever 
enter school (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; 2006) and that one-third to one-half of the gap can be explained by 
family-environment indicators (Phillips et al., 1998; Fryer and Levitt, 2004).
8  In this scenario, combating 
poverty and having more constructive out-of-school time may lead to better and more-focused instruction 
in school. Indeed, Coleman et al. (1966), in their famous report on equality of educational opportunity, 
argue that schools alone cannot treat the problem of chronic underachievement in urban schools.  
Harlem Children’s Zone is a 97-block area in central Harlem, New York, that combines reform-
minded charter schools with a web of community services designed to ensure the social environment 
outside of school is positive and supportive for children from birth to college graduation.  This provides a 
rich laboratory to understand whether communities, schools, or a combination of the two are the main 
drivers of student achievement. The answer to this question is of tremendous importance for public policy 
around the world as it goes to the heart of how communities and public goods should be allocated to 
alleviate racial and economic inequality. Organizations in Albany, Allentown, Atlanta, Boston, Camden, 
Charlotte, Detroit, Hartford, Indianola, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New 
Orleans, Orlando, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Richmond, Rochester, San Francisco, Santa Fe, Savannah, 
 
7 Interest groups such as the Education Equality Project (http://www.educationequalityproject.org/) and the Broader, 
Bolder Approach (http://www.boldapproach.org/) embody this debate.  
8 The debate over communities or schools often seems to treat these approaches as mutually exclusive, evaluating 
policies that change one aspect of the schools or a student’s learning environment.  This approach is potentially 
informative on the various partial derivatives of the educational production function, but is uninformative on the net 
effect of many simultaneous changes. The educational production function may, for example, exhibit either positive 
or negative interactions with respect to various reforms. Smaller classes and more time on task matter more (or less) 
if the student has good teachers; good teachers may matter more (or less) if the student has a good out of school 
environment, and so on.     3
Washington, DC, Israel, Netherlands, Uganda and South Africa are developing plans similar to the HCZ 
model.  
We use two separate statistical strategies to account for the fact that students who attend HCZ 
schools are not likely to be a random sample.  First, we exploit the fact that HCZ charter schools are 
required to select students by lottery when the number of applicants exceeds the number of available slots 
for admission.  In this scenario, the treatment group is composed of students who are lottery winners and 
the control group consists of students who are lottery losers.  This allows us to provide a set of causal 
estimates of the effect of being offered admission into the HCZ charter schools on a range of outcomes, 
including test scores, attendance, and grade completion.   
  There are two important caveats to our lottery identification strategy.  First, the HCZ middle 
school was not significantly oversubscribed in its first year of operation, and the HCZ elementary schools 
have never been significantly oversubscribed, making it more difficult to estimate the effect of being 
offered admission for these groups.  Second, results from any lottery sample may lack external validity.  
The counterfactual we identify is for students who are already interested in charter schools. The effect of 
being offered admission to HCZ for these students may be different than for other types of students.   
  To complement the lotteries, our second identification strategy uses the interaction between a 
student’s home address and her cohort year as an instrumental variable.  This approach takes advantage of 
two important features of the HCZ charter schools: (1) anyone is eligible to enroll in HCZ’s schools, but 
only students living inside the Zone are actively recruited by HCZ staff; and (2) there are cohorts of 
children that are ineligible due to the timing of the schools’ opening and their age.  Our identification is 
driven by the between-cohort comparison of outcomes within the Zone, using the outcomes of children 
outside the Zone to control for natural year-to-year variation in test scores.  If the interaction between a 
student’s address and cohort only affects his or her outcome through its effect on enrollment in the charter 
school, this provides another set of causal estimates. 
  Both statistical approaches lead us to the same basic story. Harlem Children’s Zone is effective at 
increasing the achievement of the poorest minority children.  Students enrolled in the sixth grade gain 
more than four fifths of a standard deviation in math and between one-quarter and one-third of a standard 
deviation in English Language Arts (ELA) by eighth grade. Taken at face value, these effects are enough 
to close the black-white achievement gap in mathematics and reduce it by about half in ELA.  Students in 
the HCZ elementary school gain approximately four fifths to one and a half a standard deviation in both 
math and ELA by third grade, closing the racial achievement gap in both subjects. HCZ students are also 
less likely to be absent. These results are robust across identification strategies, model specifications, and 
subsamples of the data. Surprisingly, students of all ability levels obtain roughly the same benefit from 
attending HCZ charters.     4
                                              
   Community programs, such as The Baby College and Harlem Gems, do not admit participants by 
lottery or admit in such a way that one can clearly identify their causal impact. Additionally, the IV 
strategy employed earlier does not have enough power in small samples.  Using least squares in multiple 
samples and datasets we fail to find any empirical evidence that either program is positively associated 
with achievement at any age, but these results should be considered suggestive because they are measured 
imprecisely.
9 
Beyond the least squares results, there are four additional pieces of evidence that suggest that the 
combined effects of the community programs alone are not responsible for the gains in achievement. 
First, our IV strategy purges the effects of the community bundle, yet the estimates are larger than the 
available lottery estimates.  Second, students outside the Zone garner the same benefit from the schools as 
the students inside the Zone, suggesting that proximity to the community programs is unimportant. Third, 
siblings of HCZ lottery winners who were themselves ineligible for the lottery because of their age, show 
no gains in achievement and modest decreases in absenteeism. Fourth, the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
experiment relocated individuals from high-poverty to low-poverty neighborhoods (while keeping 
children in roughly similar schools) and showed small positive results for girls and negative results for 
boys (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006; Kling et al., 2007).  Additionally, and more speculative, there is 
substantial anecdotal evidence that Harlem Children’s Zone was unsuccessful in raising achievement in 
the years before opening the charter schools. We cannot, however, disentangle whether communities 
coupled with high-quality schools drive our results, or whether the high-quality schools alone are 
enough. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of Harlem Children’s 
Zone. Section III introduces the data and econometric framework. Section IV presents estimates of the 
impact of four key elements of HCZ on educational outcomes. Section V discusses whether communities, 
schools, or both are most responsible for the results. Section VI concludes. There are four appendices: 
Appendix A outlines each program offered by Harlem Children’s Zone. Appendix B is a data appendix 
that details our sample and variable construction.  Appendix C empirically examines the possibility of 
cheating at HCZ.  Appendix D conducts a back of the envelope cost-benefit exercise. 
 
II. Harlem’s Children Zone 
  Harlem Children’s Zone began in 1970 as an amalgam of after-school programs, truancy-
prevention services, and anti-violence training for teenagers in schools, named the Rheedlen Centers for 
Children and Families.  The disintegration of central Harlem during the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 
    
9 Dobbie and Fryer (2009) finds scant evidence that any community programs in the Harlem Children’s Zone are 
effective at increasing academic achievement.   5
1990s prompted some within the organization to question their piecemeal methodology – several 
programs, but no comprehensive strategy.  In response, the president of Rheedlen, Geoffrey Canada, 
created the Harlem Children’s Zone to address all the problems that poor children were facing – from 
crumbling apartments to failing schools and violent crime to chronic health problems – through a 
“conveyor belt” of services from birth to college.  The approach is based on the idea that we must 
improve both communities and schools.  Starting with a 24-block area in central Harlem, the Zone 
expanded to a 64-block area in 2004 and a 97-block area in 2007. Figure 1 provides an aerial map of 
Harlem Children’s Zone and its expansion path.  
  HCZ offers a number of programs, which we have partitioned into “community” investments and 
“school” investments. Community programs are available to anyone living near HCZ, and serve 8,058 
youth and 5,291 adults. School programs are only available to the approximately 1,300 students who 
attend the HCZ public charter schools.  
 
Community Investments 
HCZ has over 20 programs designed to help and empower individuals in their 97 blocks. These 
investments include early childhood programs (Head Start, e.g.), public elementary-, middle- and high-
school programs (i.e. karate, dance, after-school tutoring), a college-success office, family, community 
and health programs, foster-care prevention services, and so on. Appendix A provides a description of all 
programs run by Harlem Children’s Zone. HCZ’s vision is to “create a tipping point” in the neighborhood 
so that children are surrounded by an enriching environment of college-oriented peers and supportive 
adults. This is consistent with the vision articulated by scholars and policymakers who argue that 
communities, not schools, are responsible for the achievement gap. Below, we describe, in greater detail, 
two of the most ambitious community programs. For a more detailed analysis of HCZ community 
programs, see Dobbie and Fryer (2009). 
The Baby College, a signature community initiative and the first program to be started, is a nine-
week parenting workshop for expectant parents and those with children up to three years old.  The 
curriculum, informed by the work of T. Berry Brazelton, covers a broad range of subjects, including brain 
development, discipline, immunization, safety, asthma, lead poisoning, parental stress, and parent-child 
bonding (Brazelton, 1992).  The College, held on Saturday mornings with weekly follow-up visits at 
home, is free of charge and offers parents a number of incentives to attend, including free breakfast, 
lunch, and daycare, as well as drawings for prizes such as gift certificates at local stores or a month’s free 
rent.  Anyone with children up to three years old is eligible to attend The Baby College, but tremendous 
effort is made to recruit parents from inside the Zone (Tough, 2008).  Thirteen HCZ employees canvass 
apartment buildings, seek suggestions for good candidates from past Baby College participants, and visit   6
laundromats, supermarkets and check-cashing outlets within the Zone in search of possible enrollees, 
including revisiting people who indicated they were interested, but never enrolled. 
  Another major community initiative is Harlem Gems, an intensive, all-day, pre-kindergarten 
program with a 4:1 child-to-adult ratio that focuses on kindergarten preparation. The curriculum is 
designed to increase socialization skills, build routines, and begin development of the pre-literacy and 
language skills students need in kindergarten. The Gems program incorporates a number of nontraditional 
subjects such as Spanish and French, and strongly encourages parents to volunteer at the school and 
become more involved in their child’s education.  Each Gems classroom employs a Family Worker, 
whose primary responsibility is ensuring that parents are active and involved.  There are monthly parent 
meetings, book nights, and field trips that parents are encouraged to attend, and between one and five 
monthly parenting workshops on a wide range of topics, including some designed purely for parental 




The HCZ Promise Academy public charter schools began in the fall of 2004 with the opening of 
the HCZ Promise Academy elementary and middle schools, followed in the fall of 2005 with the opening 
of the HCZ Promise Academy 2 Elementary School.
11  The HCZ Promise Academy will enroll a new 
kindergarten and sixth-grade cohort each year until it is a full K-12 school, while HCZ Promise Academy 
2 will enroll a new kindergarten cohort each year until it is a full K-12 school.
1213  
  The HCZ Promise Academies have an extended school day and year, with coordinated after-
school tutoring and additional classes on Saturdays for children who need remediation in mathematics and 
English Language Arts skills.  Our rough estimate is that HCZ Promise Academy students that are behind 
grade level are in school for twice as many hours as a traditional public school student in New York City. 
                                                 
10 There is also a Head Start version of Harlem Gems, which follows a similar model except that (1) children can 
enter the Head Start at three or four years of age, thus a sizable proportion of the participants receive two years of 
instruction, and (2) because of income guidelines, students in Head Start tend to come from families with lower 
socioeconomic status than that of Universal Pre-K participants.  In all versions of the program, the students are most 
often referred from The Baby College or recruited from within the HCZ borders.   
11 Promise Academy 2 held both a kindergarten and first-grade lottery their first year, enrolling 40 students in each 
grade.  After their first year of operation, Promise Academy 2 relocated, and in the process lost a number of 
students.  To simplify our analysis and abstract from the issues created by this relocation, we focus our analysis on 
Promise Academy. 
12In the fall of 2007, Promise Academy did not enroll a new sixth-grade cohort, and expelled the entire existing 
eighth-grade cohort (the 2004 lottery cohort). HCZ was unhappy with the performance of the middle school to this 
point, and the decision was made to focus on the existing sixth- and seventh-grade cohorts in reforming the school. 
Test data, which were made public months after the decision was made, showed that the 2004 cohort did quite well 
ough, 2008).  (T
13 In 2008, the lottery was moved back to fifth grade (Tough, 2008).   7
Students who are at or above grade level still attend the equivalent of about fifty percent more school in a 
calendar year.   
  Both schools emphasize the recruitment and retention of high-quality teachers and use a test-
score value-added measure to incentivize and evaluate current teachers. The schools have had high 
turnover as they search for the most effective teachers: 48 percent of HCZ Promise Academy teachers did 
not return for the 2005 – 2006 school year, 32 percent left before 2006 – 2007, and 14 percent left before 
2007 – 2008.  Each teacher has an annual meeting with Geoffrey Canada to discuss their performance, 
and is supported by myriad behind-the-scenes efforts to make sure their time is spent primarily on 
teaching and not administrative tasks. 
  The schools provide free medical, dental and mental-health services (students are screened upon 
entry and receive regular check-ups through a partnership with the Children’s Health Fund), student 
incentives for achievement (money, trips to France, e.g.), high-quality, nutritious, cafeteria meals, support 
for parents in the form of food baskets, meals, bus fare, and so forth, and less tangible benefits such as the 
support of a committed staff. The schools also make a concerted effort to change the culture of 
achievement, surrounding students with the importance of hard work in achieving success.  These types 
of school investments are consistent with those that argue high-quality schools are enough to close the 
achievement gap.   
 
Anecdotal Evidence of Success 
  A slew of anecdotal evidence suggests that the HCZ approach is working.  For six straight years, 
100 percent of pre-kindergarteners in the Harlem Gems program were school-ready. Eighty-one percent 
of parents who have attended The Baby College report reading to their child more often than they 
previously read to them. Older students in the HCZ public charter schools typically outperform their peers 
at neighboring schools, and, most recently, three young women from the HCZ chess program won the 
national championship for their age group.  In the latest progress report from the New York City 
Department of Education, the Promise Academies received an A. 
  One has to take the above evidence with a grain of salt – children who participate in HCZ are not 
a random sample of students.  Children may enroll in the Zone’s programs because they are already 
struggling or under-performing in traditional public schools, because they are identified as being 
particularly at risk by a teacher or counselor, or because they or their parents are highly motivated to seek 
out the best opportunities.  In other words, students served by HCZ are likely to be self-selected, either 
positively or negatively, and results that simply compare outcomes of HCZ children to the outcomes of 
other children in Harlem may be biased in one direction or another. 
   8
                                                
III. Data and Econometric Framework 
  We merge data from two sources: information from files at Harlem Children’s Zone and 
administrative data on student demographics and outcomes from the New York City Department of 
Education (NYCDOE).  
  The data from Harlem Children’s Zone consist of enrollment files from The Baby College and 
Harlem Gems and lottery results from the HCZ Promise Academy public charter schools.
14  A typical 
student’s data include her first name, last name, birth date, parents’ or guardians’ names, home address, 
and the program to which she is applying or attending.  With the exception of The Baby College, the HCZ 
data are remarkably complete.  The Baby College data are more sparse because almost 18 percent of 
children had not been born at the time of data collection.  In these cases “expected named” and due date 
were collected.  
The NYCDOE data contain student-level administrative data on approximately 1.1 million 
students across the five boroughs of the NYC metropolitan area.  The data include information on student 
race, gender, free and reduced-price lunch status, behavior, attendance, and matriculation with course 
grades for all students and state math and ELA test scores for students in grades three through eight.  The 
data also include a student’s first and last name, birth date, and address.  We have NYCDOE data 
spanning the 2003 – 2004 to 2008 – 2009 school years. 
The state math and ELA tests, developed by McGraw-Hill, are high-stakes exams conducted in 
the winters of third through eighth grade.
15  Students in third, fifth, and seventh grades must score level 2 
or above (out of 4) on both tests to advance to the next grade.  The math test includes questions on 
number sense and operations, algebra, geometry, measurement, and statistics.  Tests in the earlier grades 
emphasize more basic content such as number sense and operations, while later tests focus on advanced 
topics such as algebra and geometry. The ELA test is designed to assess students on three learning 
standards – information and understanding, literary response and expression, critical analysis and 
evaluation – and includes multiple-choice and short-response sections based on a reading and listening 
section, along with a brief editing task.
16   
All public-school students, including those attending charters, are required to take the math and 
ELA tests unless they are medically excused or have a severe disability.  Students with moderate 
disabilities or who are Limited English Proficient must take both tests, but may be granted special 
accommodations (additional time, translation services, and so on) at the discretion of school or state 
 
14The exception being the 2004 middle-school cohort, for which the lottery numbers were lost, and the 2006 
ementary-school lottery cohort, which is still being compiled by HCZ staff.  el
 Sample tests can be found at  15 http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/osa/testsample.html 
16 Content breakdown by grade and additional exam information is available at 
http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/osa/pub/reports.shtml  administrators.  In our analysis the test scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one for each grade and year.
17 
We also construct measures of absenteeism and matriculation using the NYCDOE data.   
Absenteeism is measured as the total number of absences a student accumulates during the first 180 days 
of the school year.  After the first 180 days, the NYCDOE no longer collects absence data from schools.  
Matriculation is an indicator for whether a student is “on-time” given her expected grade.  In our 
elementary-school sample a student’s expected grade is imputed from her initial kindergarten year.  If a 
student enters kindergarten in 2003 – 2004, she is on time if enrolled in first grade in 2004 – 2005, second 
grade in 2005 – 2006, and so on.  If we do not observe an elementary student in kindergarten, we impute 
an expected grade from the student’s birth date.  In our middle-school sample a student’s expected grade 
is imputed from her initial sixth-grade year.
18  If we do not observe a student in sixth grade, we impute an 
expected grade from the nearest observed grade. 
  The HCZ data were matched to the New York City administrative data using the maximum 
amount of information available. Match keys were used in the following order: (1) last name, first name, 
date of birth with various versions of the names (abbreviations, alternative spellings, hyphenated vs. non-
hyphenated); (2) last name, first name, and various versions of the date of birth (most often the month and 
day reversed); (3) last name, first name, prior school, and prior grade with various likely adjustments to 
prior grade; (4) name, date of birth, and prior grade. Once these match keys had been run, the remaining 
data were matched by hand considering all available variables.  Match rates were 93.1 percent for the 
Harlem Gems data (N=451), 92.6 percent for the winners of the kindergarten lottery (N=203), 89.2 
percent for the losers of the kindergarten lottery (N=195), 90.5 percent for the winners of the middle-
school lottery (N=200), and 85.5 percent for the losers of the middle-school lottery (N=352).
19 These 
numbers are comparable to the match rates achieved by others using similar data (Hoxby and Murarka, 
2009).   
Match rates for The Baby College were significantly lower.  Recall, approximately 18 percent of 
the Baby College sample was not born yet, necessitating that we match on expected name and due date.  
  9
                                                   
17 Results are of similar magnitude and statistical significance when raw or percentile scores are used instead of 
rdized scores.  standa
18 In our sample 24 percent of all students and 27 percent of black students have already been held back by sixth 
ade.  As a result, a matriculation measure based on kindergarten enrollment is less informative.  gr
19 If nonrandom attrition is driving the difference in match rates in our middle-school sample, our results may be 
biased. We explore the sensitivity of our results by creating pseudo-lottery losers to equalize the match rates for each 
cohort.  These pseudo-students are assigned the highest test score observed in the control group for that year (about 
two standard deviations above the mean).  The results of this exercise are available in Appendix Table 2.  The 
estimated effect of attending the Promise Academy Middle School remain qualitatively similar, with ITT and TOT 
effects only slightly smaller than the main lottery results reported in Table 3.  We also note that our IV estimates 
using the interaction between a student’s cohort and address should be unaffected by the difference in match rates as 
it is based entirely on the NYCDOE data.   Another 20 percent of The Baby College sample did not have age or birth date information.  Finally, a 
number of Baby College participants were too young to be in our NYCDOE dataset.  Within participants 
with complete information and of appropriate age, we were able to match 61.29 percent (N=987) of our 
sample. As Baby College participants have three to six years to attrite before we observe them in the 
NYCDOE data, this is consistent with our expected match rate.  
  Using the student addresses provided by the NYCDOE, we also calculated the distance from each 
student’s home to the nearest point on the boundary of the Harlem Children’s Zone using arcGIS.  When 
multiple addresses were available for a single student, we use the earliest available address.
20  A student 
is defined as living “in the Zone” if they live completely inside or touching the boundaries of the original 
24-block Zone.  
  Summary statistics for the variables that we use in our core specifications are displayed in Table 
1.  Students who entered the elementary- or middle-school lottery are more likely to be black, but all other 
variables, including eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, are similar to the typical New York City 
student. Students enrolled in the middle school lottery score 0.287 standard deviations and 0.266 standard 
deviations below the typical New York City student in fifth grade math and ELA respectively, but 
outscore the typical student living in the Zone by 0.186 in math (p-value = 0.001) and 0.062 in ELA (p-
value = 0.289). 
 
Econometric Approach to Estimating the Causal Impact of Harlem Children’s Zone 
  The simplest and most direct test of any HCZ program would be to examine the outcome of 




outcomei   Xi  HCZii. 
If students select into the programs because of important unobserved determinants of academic outcomes, 
such estimates may be biased. To confidently identify the causal impact of HCZ enrollment, we must 
compare students with different enrollment statuses who would have had the same academic outcomes 
had they both been enrolled or not enrolled in the program.  By definition, this involves a counterfactual 
we cannot observe.   
  In our analysis, we construct the counterfactual in two ways. First, we exploit the fact that HCZ 
public charter schools are required to select students by lottery when demand exceeds supply, and, 
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20 Another approach is to use the student’s address closest to the date of the lottery. The results are not sensitive to 
this alternative. Our view is that the earlier address was more likely to be exogenous. second, by using the interaction between a student’s home address and cohort year as an instrumental 
variable.   
  New York law dictates that over-subscribed charter schools allocate enrollment offers via a 
random lottery.  Restricting our analysis to students who entered the HCZ lottery, we can estimate the 
causal impact of being offered admission into the public charter school by comparing average outcomes 
of students who ‘won’ the lottery to the average outcomes of students who ‘lost’ the lottery. The lottery 
losers therefore form the control group corresponding to the counterfactual state that would have occurred 
for students in the treatment group if they had not been offered a spot at the public charter school.   
 Let  Zi be an indicator for a winning lottery number. The mean difference in outcomes between 
the lottery winners (Zi = 1) and lottery losers (Zi = 0) is known as the “Intent-to-Treat” (ITT) effect, and 
is estimated by regressing student outcomes on Zi. In theory, predetermined student characteristics ( Xi) 
should have the same distribution within the lottery winners and losers because they are statistically 
independent of group assignment.  In small samples, however, more precise estimates of the ITT can 
often be found by controlling for these student characteristics ( Xi). The specifications estimated are of 
the form:  
(1)                                                   outcomei 1  Xi1  Zi1 1i 
where our vector of controls,  Xi , includes an indicator variable for gender, a mutually inclusive and 
collectively exhaustive set of race dummies, an indicator for free lunch, and predetermined measures of 
the outcome variable when possible (i.e. pre-lottery test scores).
21  
  The ITT is an average of the causal effects for students who enroll in the public charter school 
and those that do not.  The ITT therefore captures the causal effect of being offered a spot in the HCZ 
public charter school, not of actually attending. 
  Under several assumptions (that the treatment group assignment is random, lottery losers are not 
allowed to enroll, and winning the lottery only affects outcomes through public charter school 
enrollment), we can also estimate the causal impact of actually enrolling in the HCZ public charter 
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21 A student is income-eligible for free lunch if her family income is below 130 percent of the federal poverty 
guidelines, or categorically eligible if (1) the student’s household receives assistance under the Food Stamp 
Program, the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR), or the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Children Program (TANF); (2) the student was enrolled in Head Start on the basis of meeting that program’s low-
income criteria, (3) the student is homeless, (4) the student is a migrant child, or (5) the student is a runaway child 
receiving assistance from a program under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act and is identified by the local 
educational liaison.  A student is eligible for reduced-price lunch if family income is between 130 and 185 percent 
of federal poverty guidelines. Approximately 70 percent of our sample is eligible for free lunch, with another ten 
percent eligible for reduced-price lunch. school.
 22  This parameter, commonly known as the “Treatment-on-Treated” (TOT) effect, measures the 
average effect of enrollment on lottery winners who choose to attend the HCZ public charter school.  The 
TOT parameter can be estimated though a two-stage least squares regression of student outcomes on 
enrollment ( ) with lottery status ( HCZi Zi) as an instrumental variable for enrollment: 
(2)                                                outcomei 2  2Xi  2HCZi 2i 
The TOT is the estimated difference in outcomes between students who actually enroll in the public 
charter school and those in the control group who would have enrolled if they had been offered a spot.   
  A key concern in estimating the TOT is how to account for students who leave the charter school.  
Over time, it is inevitable that students leave the HCZ public charter schools, either through natural 
attrition or because they are asked to leave.  First- (and second-) year attrition from the HCZ Promise 
Academy is 8.5 (17.6) percent for the elementary school and 15.6 (26.4) percent for the middle school, 
compared to 9.7 (17.0) percent for KIPP Star – a nationally recognized charter middle school two blocks 
from the western boundary of the Zone – and 16.4 (30.3) for the middle schools most demographically 
similar to HCZ. Demographically similar elementary schools all experience first-year attrition of over 40 
percent.
 23 
If attrition is nonrandom, the TOT estimates may be biased if we estimate the effect of current 
enrollment.  We therefore let   be an indicator for a student ever having been enrolled at the public 
charter school, regardless of her current enrollment status.  In the current paper, this will serve as a lower-
bound estimate of the true effect. If we used the indicator as current enrollment we get TOT estimates that 
are approximately three and a half percent higher than those reported and if we use years of enrollment 
(as others in the literature have done, see, for example, Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009) we get estimates that 
are approximately two percent higher in seventh grade and three percent higher in eighth grade. 
HCZi
  To compliment the lotteries, our second statistical strategy exploits the interaction between a 
student’s home address and cohort year as an instrumental variable.  Two forces drive our identification.  
                                                 
22 Four to five students in each middle school cohort enroll despite having “losing” lottery numbers due to clerical 
errors (private correspondence with HCZ), but otherwise the lottery is binding.  To insure that the TOT assumptions 
are valid, we code these individuals as not having received treatment.  Coding these individuals as having received 
treatment would imply that our estimates are a LATE, and results in somewhat larger point estimates. The 
kindergarten lotteries were not significantly oversubscribed in any year, and as a result, nearly every student was 
eventually offered a spot at the charter school.  As a result we cannot estimate ITT and TOT effects for these 
cohorts.  We are able to use a student’s position on the waitlist as an instrumental variable and estimate a local 
erage treatment effect of attending the school.  This is discussed further in the results section.    
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23 First-year attrition in elementary school is defined as the percent of students who leave between kindergarten and 
first grade.  In the HCZ and public middle schools, attrition is defined as the percent of students who leave between 
sixth and seventh grades, and in KIPP Star it is defined as the percent that leave between fifth and sixth grades.  
Demographically similar public schools were chosen by minimizing the weighted difference in available 
demographic variables and previous test scores between all NYC schools and the HCZ Promise Academy.  Weights 
were determined by regressing a previous cohort’s demographic variables on test scores.  First, we compare outcomes between children living in the Zone who were eligible for its public charter 
schools and students living in the Zone who were not eligible.  For example, students who started 
kindergarten in 2003 were ineligible for the HCZ public charter school, which began enrolling 
kindergarten students in 2004.  As the 2003 cohort is likely to be quite similar to the 2004 cohort, they 
provide a plausible counterfactual. Second, we compare the outcomes of children living outside the Zone 
in the two cohorts to adjust for year-to-year variation that may come about through broad city-wide 
reforms.   
  The basic logic and evidence for our IV strategy is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the 
percentage of students enrolled in the HCZ public charter schools and mean test scores for two successive 
cohorts.
24  In both panels, the vertical axis represents enrollment rates (the denominator is all children in 
the specified area) and the horizontal axis represents distance in meters to the nearest point on the Zone’s 
border. The left panel is the 2004 cohort who are age-eligible for the HCZ Promise Academy; the right 
panel contains the 2003 cohort who was born a year too early and were already in kindergarten when the 
lottery commenced. Our identification strategy compares the outcomes of children in the Zone between 
the eligible and ineligible cohorts, letting the age-ineligible students form the counterfactual of what 
would have occurred had the age-eligible children not enrolled in the public charter school.  We also 
compare children outside the Zone to adjust for year-to-year achievement shocks. 
  Let enrollment in HCZ programs be a function of student characteristics ( Xi), home address 
( ), cohort year ( ), and the interaction between address and cohort year:  inZonei Cohorti
(3)                    HCZi 3 3Xi 3inZonei 3Cohorti 3 inZonei *Cohorti  3i 
The residual of this representative “first-stage” equation (3) captures other factors that are correlated with 
enrollment in HCZ that may be related to student outcomes.  The key identifying assumptions of our 
approach is that (1) the interaction between address (in or out of Zone boundaries) and cohort year is 
correlated with enrollment, and (2) the interaction between address and cohort year only affects student 
outcomes through its effects on the probability of enrollment, not through any other factor or unobserved 
characteristic.   
  The first assumption is econometrically testable.  Appendix Table 1 presents results from 
representative first-stage regressions, where enrollment in the HCZ public charter school at kindergarten 
and sixth grade are regressed on student race, lunch status, address, cohort year and the interaction 
                                                 
24 In our elementary-school sample a student’s cohort is imputed from her initial kindergarten year.  If we do not 
observe an elementary student in kindergarten, we impute the expected grade from the student’s birth date.  In our 
iddle-school sample a student’s cohort is imputed from her initial sixth-grade year. If we do not observe a student 




 between address and cohort year.  For kindergarten enrollment, five of the eight interactions are 
significant at the one-percent level and the remaining three are significant at the five-percent level.  For 
sixth-grade enrollment, four of the seven interactions are significant at the one-percent level.  For both 
regressions, a joint F-test with the null that the interactions are jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected (p-
value = 0.000). 
  The validity of our second identifying assumption – that the instrument only affects student 
outcomes through the probability of enrollment - is more difficult to assess.  To be violated, the 
interaction between a student’s address and cohort year must be correlated with her outcomes after 
controlling for the student’s background characteristics, address and cohort year.  This assumes, for 
instance, that parents do not selectively move into the Children’s Zone based on their child’s cohort.  
Given that all children, regardless of their address, are eligible for HCZ programs, this seems a plausible 
assumption.  Motivated parents can enroll their children in the programs no matter where they live; the 
relationship between distance to the Zone and enrollment comes about primarily through increased 
knowledge about the programs or cost of attending, not eligibility. We also assume that shocks either 
affect everyone in a given cohort regardless of address, or affect everyone at a given address regardless of 
cohort.  If there is a something that shifts achievement test scores for third graders living inside the 
Children’s Zone, but not third graders outside the Zone or fourth graders inside the Zone, our second 
identifying assumption is violated.
25    
  Under these assumptions (and a monotonicity assumption that being born into an eligible cohort 
does not make a student less likely to enroll) we can estimate the causal impact of enrolling in the HCZ 
public charter school.  The identified parameter, commonly known as the local average treatment effect 
(LATE), measures the average effect of treatment for students induced into enrollment by the instrument 
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  The LATE parameter is estimated though a two-stage least squares 
regression of student outcomes on enrollment ( ) with the interaction between address and cohort as 
an instrumental variable for enrollment.   
HCZi
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25 For our second identifying assumption to be valid, there should be no difference in the relationship between 
eligible and ineligible students living inside the Zone and the relationship between eligible and ineligible students 
living outside the Zone (Eligiblein-Ineligiblein= Eligibleout-Ineligibleout). Appendix Table 3 presents a partial test of 
this assumption.  Columns 1 through 4 and 6 through 9 present basic demographic statistics for the IV sample.  
Columns 5 and 10 present p-values from a test with the null hypothesis that the difference between eligible and 
ineligible cohorts is the same for students in the Zone and out of the Zone.  Ineligible students living outside the 
Zone are more likely to be eligible for reduced price lunch.  There are no other statistically significant differences.     15
                                             
  Figures 3-5 provide a visual representation of our basic results from HCZ Promise Academy – 
Middle School. Figure 3A plots yearly, raw, mean state math test scores, from fourth to eighth grade, for 
four subgroups: lottery winners, lottery losers, white students in New York City public schools and black 
students in New York City public schools. Lottery winners are comprised of students who either won the 
lottery or who had a sibling that is already enrolled in the HCZ Promise Academy. Lottery losers are 
individuals who lost the lottery and did not have a sibling already enrolled.
26 Technically, these represent 
ITT estimates.  
  In fourth and fifth grade, before they enter the middle school, math test scores for lottery winners, 
losers, and the typical black student in New York City are virtually identical, and roughly 0.75 standard 
deviations behind the typical white student.
27 Lottery winners have a modest increase in sixth grade, 
followed by a more substantial increase in seventh grade and even larger gains by their eighth-grade year.  
  The TOT estimate, which is the effect of actually attending the HCZ Promise Academy Middle 
School, is depicted in panel B of Figure 3.  As we directly observe test scores of lottery winners who 
enroll and we have a TOT estimate, we can estimate the mean test score for those in the control group 
who would have enrolled if they had won the lottery (Kling et al., 2007).  The TOT results follow a 
similar pattern, showing remarkable convergence between children in the middle school and the average 
white student in New York City. After three years of “treatment,” HCZ Promise Academy students have 
nearly closed the achievement gap in math – they are behind their white counterparts by 0.121 standard 
deviations (p-value = 0.113).  If one adjusts for gender and free lunch, the typical eighth grader enrolled 
in the HCZ middle school outscores the typical white eighth grader in New York City public schools by 
0.087 standard deviations though the difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.238). Put 
differently, the typical student before entering the HCZ public charter school was at the 20
th percentile of 
the white distribution. After three years, the typical student is at the 45
th percentile before adjusting for 
gender and free lunch and the 54
th percentile after adjusting for gender and free lunch. 
  Figure 4A plots yearly state ELA test scores, from fourth to eighth grade. Treatment and control 
designations are identical to Figure 3A. In fourth and fifth grade, before they enter the middle school, 
ELA scores for lottery winners, losers, and the typical black student in NYC are not statistically different, 
and roughly 0.65 standard deviations behind the typical white student.
28  Lottery winners and losers have 
very similar ELA scores from fourth through seventh grade. In eighth grade, HCZ Promise Academy 
     
26 Lottery winners were defined using information provided by HCZ regarding the last student called off the waitlist 
– number 10 in 2005 and number eighteen in 2006. Given the size of the estimated treatment effect, our results are 
bust to other definitions of “lottery winner.”   ro
27 This is similar in magnitude to the math racial achievement gap in nationally representative samples (0.882 in 
yer and Levitt, 2006, and 0.763 in Campbell et al., 2000), and samples with an urban focus (Fryer 2009c).  Fr
28 This is smaller than the reading racial achievement gap in some nationally representative samples (0.771 in Fryer 
and Levitt, 2006, and 0.960 in Campbell et al., 2000), but similar to data with an urban focus (Fryer 2009c).     16
                                                
students distance themselves from the control group. These results are statistically meaningful, but much 
less so than the math results.  The TOT estimate, depicted in panel B of Figure 4, follows an identical 
pattern with marginally larger differences between enrolled middle-school students and the control group.  
Adjusting for gender and free lunch pushes the results in the expected direction. 
  Interventions in education often have larger impacts on math scores as compared to reading or 
ELA scores (e.g. Decker et al., 2004; Rockoff, 2004; Jacob, 2005).  This may be because it is relatively 
easier to teach math skills, or that reading skills are more likely to be learned outside of school.  Another 
explanation is that language and vocabulary skills may develop early in life, making it difficult to impact 
reading scores in adolescence (Hart and Risley, 1995; Nelson, 2000).  
  Thus far, we have concentrated solely on the average student. It is important to know which 
students benefit the most from being offered a spot at the HCZ Promise Academy middle school. The 
distributions of test scores, by treatment status, are plotted in Figures 5A and 5B.  The modest gains in 
sixth-grade math scores appear to come primarily from the left tail of the distribution. By seventh and 
eighth grade, however, the lottery winner and lottery loser score distributions have noticeably separated 
across all ex ante achievement levels. In stark contrast, gains in eighth-grade ELA scores appear to come 
primarily from the left tail of the distribution.   
Table 2 provides some concrete numbers, and, more importantly, standard errors to the figures 
just described. Columns 1 and 2 present ITT and TOT estimates of the pooled sample of both cohorts.  
Columns 3 through 6 provide identical estimates for the 2005 and 2006 cohorts respectfully. Each row 
represents a different outcome of interest, including math and ELA achievement scores from standardized 
statewide exams, an indicator for whether or not a student is scoring on grade level, absences, and 
whether or not a student matriculates on time.  The sample is restricted to students with outcome data in 
2008 - 2009, the most recent available year.
29 
  In the pooled sample, a lottery winner scores 0.249 (0.053) standard deviations higher in sixth-
grade mathematics, 0.275 (0.054) standard deviations higher in seventh grade, and 0.546 (0.076) standard 
deviations in eighth-grade math relative to lottery losers.  Lottery winners are 11.6 (4.8) percent more 
likely to be performing on grade level in mathematics in sixth grade, 17.9 (4.3) percent more likely in 
 
29 There is not a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of lottery losers and lottery winners being in our 
final dataset.  Regressing an indicator for being included in the final dataset on an indicator for winning the lottery 
and basic demographic controls, the coefficient on the being a lottery winner is 0.0248 (0.0301) in the Middle 
School sample and 0.0446 (0.0326) in the Elementary School sample. If nonrandom attrition is driving the 
differences in the probability of being in our final data set, our results may be biased. We can explore the sensitivity 
of our results by creating pseudo-lottery losers to equalize the rates for each group, similar to the sensitivity exercise 
conducted in Appendix Table 2.  Even when these pseudo-students are assigned the highest test score observed in 
the control group for that year (about two standard deviations above the mean) the results are nearly identical to 
those presented below.   17
                                             
seventh grade, and 27.5 (4.3) percent in eighth grade.
30 ELA achievement is strikingly similar between 
lottery winners and losers until their eighth-grade year, where admission into HCZ Promise Academy 
middle schools causes a 0.190 (0.058) standard deviation increase in ELA achievement. 
The effect of actually attending the HCZ Promise Academy – the TOT estimate – is 
proportionately larger.  In the pooled sample, an enrollee scores 0.348 (0.073) standard deviations higher 
in sixth-grade math, 0.394 (0.076) higher in seventh-grade math, 0.765 (0.100) higher in eighth-grade 
math, and 0.266 (0.081) higher in eighth-grade ELA relative to non-enrollees. As before, the effect of 
attending HCZ Promise Academy on sixth and seventh grade ELA scores is essentially zero (0.047 
(0.075) and 0.041 (0.072), respectively). 
  Lottery winners are absent less in the first 180 days than the control group in every grade – 2.984 
(0.704) days in sixth grade, 2.202 (1.290) days in seventh grade, and 3.960 (1.323) days in eighth grade. 
There are no statistically significant differences in matriculation between the lottery winners and lottery 
losers. For sixth and seventh grade, the magnitude of the results in the 2006 cohort are bigger than the 
2005 cohort; for eighth grade the magnitude of the results are larger for the 2005 cohort. There is no 
obvious explanation for these patterns. The pooled sample, mechanically, falls in between these two sets 
of estimates. The advantage of the pooled sample is that the standard errors are slightly lower. 
  Table 3 presents instrumental variable results for our middle-school cohort. Our instrumental-
variables strategy is most useful in examining programs that do not have oversubscribed lotteries, but it 
can also provide a useful robustness check of our lottery estimates, tests the external validity of our lottery 
estimates, and allows us to include the 2004 middle-school cohort whose lottery numbers were apparently 
lost.  A key assumption in our instrumental-variables analysis is that students outside the Zone provide an 
effective control for year-to-year variation (changes in the test, new community programs, and so on).  If 
shocks are local, it is preferable to restrict our sample to students who live very close to the Zone.  If 
shocks are more widespread, however, expanding the number of students in our sample will increase 
precision without biasing our results.  We do not have strong prior beliefs on the proximity of the shocks, 
so we estimate a number of specifications, including samples that are restricted to students within 800, 
1600 and 2400 meters of the border of the Zone.  Appendix Figure 1 displays poverty rates of the Zone 
and the surrounding areas.  Addresses within 800 meters of the Zone are quite similar.  As we get farther 
away from the original Zone the sample includes more and more affluent areas.  In practice, the results 
are qualitatively similar across the reported samples. To improve precision we drop students with test 
scores greater than three standard deviations from the mean and students with more than 50 absences.  
Results are qualitatively similar if all students are included in the regressions.
31 
     
30
31 Students with more than 50 absences or greater than three standard deviations away from the mean make up about 
 A student that scores either a 3 or 4 (on a 4-point scale) on the state test is considered “at or above grade level.”   18
                                                                                                                                                            
  Each entry in Table 3 is an estimate of the effect of being enrolled at the HCZ Promise Academy 
Charter School in sixth grade on the reported outcome, with standard errors clustered at the cohort level in 
parentheses.
32 Columns 1 through 3 of Table 3 demonstrate that the effect on math achievement is large, 
positive, and increasing as children age.  Point estimates range from 0.066 (0.562) to 0.217 (0.568) 
standard deviations for sixth-grade scores, 0.902 (0.299) to 1.208 (0.405) for seventh-grade scores, and 
1.130 (0.153) to 1.298 (0.191) for eighth-grade scores.  Consistent with these results, HCZ Promise 
Academy middle-school students are 0.512 (0.124) to 0.636 (0.127) more likely to be at or above grade 
level by eighth grade in math. Consistent with our lottery estimates, the treatment effect of HCZ on 
achievement is smaller for ELA scores.  Point estimates range from -0.010 (0.402) to 0.052 (0.311) 
standard deviations for sixth grade, 0.209 (0.461) to 0.318 (0.385) for seventh grade, and 0.136 (0.303) to 
0.273 (0.257) for eighth grade. None of the ELA estimates are statistically significant.  That the LATE 
estimates in Table 3 are so similar to the TOT estimates in Table 2 gives us added confidence that our IV 
strategy is valid.  
  Let us put the magnitude of our estimates in perspective. Jacob and Ludwig (2008), in a survey of 
programs and policies designed to increase achievement among poor children, report that only three often 
practiced educational policies pass a simple cost-benefit analysis: lowering class size, bonuses for 
teachers for teaching in hard-to-staff schools, and early childhood programs. The effect of lowering class 
size from 24 to 16 students per teacher is approximately 0.22 (0.05) standard deviations on combined 
math and reading scores (Krueger, 1999). While a one-standard deviation increase in teacher quality 
raises math achievement by 0.15 to 0.24 standard deviations per year and reading achievement by 0.15 to 
0.20 standard deviations per year (Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2005; Aaronson, Barrow, and 
Sander, 2007; Kane and Staiger, 2008), value added measures are not strongly correlated with observable 
characteristics of teachers making it difficult to ex ante identify the best teachers. The effect of Teach for 
America, one attempt to bring more skilled teachers into struggling schools, is 0.15 standard deviations in 
math and 0.03 in reading (Decker et al., 2004).  The effect of Head Start is 0.147 (0.103) deviations in 
applied problems and 0.319 (0.147) in letter identification on the Woodcock-Johnson exam, but the 
effects on test scores fade in elementary school (Currie and Thomas, 1995; Ludwig and Phillips, 2007). 
An average charter school in New York City raises math scores by 0.09 (0.01) standard deviations per 
year and ELA scores by 0.04 (0.01) standard deviations per year (Hoxby and Muraka, 2009). All these 
 
5 percent of our overall sample.  According to the NYCDOE, these students are most likely those that did not fill in 
their test sheet at all, and those with missing or corrupt data.  It also clearly includes habitual truants with correct 
ta.  da
32 Bertrand et al. (2004) find that clustering standard errors when the number of groups is small can lead to over-
rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect.  In Monte Carlo simulations using CPS data, they find that the null is 
rejected falsely 8 percent of the time with 10 groups, and 11.6 percent of the time with 6 groups.  Our IV results 
should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.  We thank Josh Angrist and Esther Duflo for raising this issue.   19
                                             
effects are a small fraction of the impact of being offered admission into HCZ public charter schools. 
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) find effect sizes closest to our own, with students enrolled in a set of Boston 
charter middle schools gaining about 0.539 (0.078) standard deviations per year in math and about 0.171 
(0.052) standard deviations per year in ELA. 
  Table 4 explores the sensitivity of our estimated treatment effects on a variety of subsamples of 
the data. We report only the TOT estimates from our lottery results and their associated standard errors. 
The first column of the table reports baseline results from the pooled regressions in Table 3. Columns 2 
and 3 present coefficients for two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsamples (i.e. boys 
versus girls). The last column provides the p-value on a test of equality between the coefficients.  
  Surprisingly, there are no statistically meaningful differences among subsets including students 
who entered below or above the median test score, free lunch status, and students who live within 400 
meters of the boundary of Harlem Children’s Zone compared to students that do not.
33 In other words, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that every subgroup benefits equally from attending. 
Although the above results provide great optimism for the possibility of reform in urban public 
schools, one worries that improvements on state exams may be driven by test specific preparatory 
activities at the expense of more general learning. Jacob (2005), for example, finds evidence that the 
introduction of accountability programs increases high stakes test scores without increasing scores on 
low-stakes tests, most likely through increases in test-specific skills and student effort. It is important to 
know whether the results presented above are being driven by actual gains in general knowledge or 
whether the improvements are only relevant to the high-stakes state exams.
34   
To provide some evidence on this question, we present data from the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS) that was administered to every student enrolled at the HCZ public charter schools. The ITBS is a 
standardized, multiple-choice exam administered in grades 3 through 8.  The ITBS is used by nearly 
every school district in Iowa and many districts nationally.
35  We report National Percentile Rank scores, 
which compares a student to a national sample of students who are in the same grade and who were tested 
at the same time of year (fall or spring).  As a result of this standardization, having the same score across 
time implies “normal” academic progress.  There are two important caveats to our ITBS results.  First, 
scores are not available for the control group, so the evidence is only suggestive. Second, we do not have 
scores for any other schools in NYC, making comparisons between improvements on the New York 
specific state exam and improvements on the ITBS exam impossible.  
     
33 We also investigated the effects of being 200 and 600 meters from the Zone and obtained the same results.  
34 Whether general learning or the willingness and ability to prepare for an important exam is most correlated with 
longer term outcomes (health, education, crime, wages) is a crucial open question (Duckworth et al., 2006; 
uckworth et al., 2007; Segal, 2007).   D
35 More information on the ITBS is available at http://www.education.uiowa.edu/itp/itbs/    20
                                             
  With these important caveats in mind, figures 6A and 6B report ITBS math and reading 
comprehension scores for HCZ middle school students.  ITBS scores are not available in 6
th grade for the 
2005 cohort, so we plot scores of the two cohorts separately.  The sample is restricted to students who 
have valid scores in each grade.  The ITBS trends are similar, if more modest, than the results using state 
test scores. The 2006 cohort scored 40.8 and 34.7 on math and reading respectively in the fall of 6
th grade, 
and 48.7 and 41.1 in the spring of 7
th grade.  To put this in context, the typical Black 8
th grade student in 
New York City scored at about the 25
th percentile of the 2007 NAEP math exam, and about the 23
rd 
percentile of the 2007 NAEP reading exam.  
 
HCZ Promise Academy -- Elementary School 
  The HCZ Promise Academy elementary-school lotteries, which admitted students in kindergarten 
for Fall 2004, 2005, and 2006, have never been significantly oversubscribed.
36 As a result, nearly all 
lottery “losers” are eventually offered admission into the public charter school.  This prevents us from 
estimating the ITT and TOT effects as cleanly as we did for the middle-school students.  Instead, we use 
two statistical techniques. First, we construct IV estimates using a student's address interacted with cohort 
as an instrument similar to those presented in Table 3. Second, we use a student’s waitlist number as an 
instrument in the sample of students who entered the lottery. Under a number of plausible identifying 
assumptions (a low waitlist number is correlated with enrollment, one’s position on the waiting list is 
random, being higher on the waiting list does not make one more likely to enroll, and that a low waitlist 
position only influences outcomes through its effect on enrollment), we can identify the causal effect of 
attending the HCZ Promise Academy elementary public charter school on student outcomes.  Our 
variation in enrollment comes primarily from the timing of the enrollment offer. Students with a winning 
lottery number or a very low waitlist number were typically offered a spot at the HCZ school in the early 
summer, while students with a very high waitlist number are typically not offered a spot until late summer 
or early fall, after the school year had already commenced. 
  Table 5 presents estimates from our main IV strategy. The reported coefficient is an indicator of 
being enrolled at the HCZ public charter school in kindergarten, which is instrumented for using the 
interaction between a student’s address (in or out of the Zone’s boundaries) and cohort.  As before, we 
restrict the sample to students with test scores no greater than three standard deviations from the mean 
and no more than 50 absences, but results are qualitatively similar if all students are included in the 
regressions.  Standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are reported in parentheses.   
The effect of being enrolled at the elementary public charter school on third-grade test scores -- 
the first year that children in New York take standardized exams – is large, with point estimates ranging 
     
36 We are still waiting on Harlem Children's Zone to assemble the lottery files from the 2006 kindergarten cohort. from 1.117 (0.581) to 1.296 (0.417) standard deviations in math and 1.389 (0.601) to 1.570 (0.521) in 
ELA.  Results for fourth grade math are more modest, ranging from 0.446 (0.242) to 0.669 (0.197), while 
our estimates for fourth grade ELA are consistently large (1.052 (0.418) to 1.479 (0.376)). Even our 
modest estimates suggest that the HCZ elementary school eliminates racial gaps in both math and ELA.  
The relatively large gains in ELA are particularly noteworthy in light of our middle-school results, 
suggesting that deficiencies in ELA might be addressed if intervention occurs relatively early in the 
child’s life.  This is consistent with developmental research that shows that the critical period for 
language development occurs early in life, while the critical period for developing higher cognitive 
functions extends into adolescence (Hopkins and Bracht, 1975; Newport, 1990; Pinker, 1994; Nelson, 
2000; Knudsen et al., 2006).   
  Table 6 presents a series of estimates for the elementary school lottery sample using a student’s 
waitlist number as an instrumental variable.
37  The IV estimates suggest that children who attend the 
elementary school gain 0.644 (0.436) standard deviations in math and 0.994 (0.410) standard deviations 
in ELA by third grade, and 1.032 (0.569) standard deviations in math and 0.476 (0.514) standard 
deviations in ELA by fourth grade, but imprecision makes definitive conclusions impossible.  Students 
have  8.131 (4.617) fewer absences in first grade, 10.002 (4.334) fewer in second and 6.915 (4.486) fewer 
in third grade.  HCZ students also appear to be more likely to matriculate on time in the lottery results.  
Given that the IV results in Table 5 indicate that students are less likely to matriculate on time and have 
about the same number of absences, we suggest interpreting both sets of results with caution. 
Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) test scores of HCZ elementary students are plotted in Figures 
7A and 7B. As with the middle school cohort, scores are not available for the control group, so the 
evidence is only suggestive. We report National Percentile Rank scores, which compares the score of a 
student to a national sample of students who are in the same grade and who were tested at the same time 
of year (fall or spring).  As a result of this standardization, having the same score across time implies 
“normal” academic progress.  ITBS scores are not available in Kindergarten for the 2004 cohort, so we 
plot scores of the two cohorts separately.  The sample is restricted to students who have valid scores in 
each grade.  Students do not take the reading comprehension portion of the exam until first grade, so we 
report the average of the word analysis and vocabulary subset scores instead.   
Relative to the middle school cohort, ITBS scores for the elementary cohorts are noisier, making 
interpretation of the results more difficult.  It appears that students gain relative to their national peers in 
  21
                                                   
37 We use a dichotomous instrument indicating whether a student received an offer before the start of classes in the 
fall of their Kindergarten year.  This information was available in the HCZ lottery files, which indicated the date a 
student was called from the waitlist.  In the pooled first stage regression, being offered a spot at HCZ before the start 
of the school year is associated with a 0.24 (0.05) increase in the probability of enrolling at the HCZ Promise 
Academy.   22
                                             
all subject areas in their first year to year and a half at the Promise Academy, but make only normal 
progress after that.  Elementary students start with a much smaller deficit than their middle school 
counterparts and are at or above the national average after one to two years of attending the Promise 
Academy. To put this in context, the typical Black 4
th grade student in New York City scored in about the 
31
st percentile of the 2007 NAEP math exam, and about the 30
th percentile of the 2007 NAEP reading 
exam.   
 
 
The Baby College and Harlem Gems  
  The Baby College (the nine-week parenting program) and Harlem Gems (the preschool program) 
do not admit students in such a way that one can confidently identify their impact and our IV strategy 
employed earlier does not have enough power in such small samples.
38  
  Panel A of Table 7 fits least squares models to the entire New York City sample.  This estimate 
represents the partial correlation of attending Harlem Gems or The Baby College on our set of third grade 
outcomes. To the extent that more motivated parents put their children in programs such as The Baby 
College and Harlem Gems, our correlations are an underestimate of the true effect. If, on the other hand, 
HCZ staff recruits less-motivated parents, our correlations are overestimates.  As such, we strongly 
caution against any causal interpretation of the forthcoming estimates.  We control for gender, race and 
lunch status.
39 Consistent with our main results, the association between third grade test scores and 
attending the Promise Academy is positive and statistically significant.  Harlem Gems and The Baby 
College, on the other hand, are associated with a decrease in third grade math and ELA scores, though the 
neither estimate is statistically significant.   
Results from Panel A may be driven by negative selection into Harlem Gems or The Baby 
College.  To partially account for this, Panel B of Table 7 presents results restricting the sample to 
students living in or around the Zone and Panel C presents results restricting the sample to students who 
entered the 2004 or 2005 Kindergarten Lottery.  Results from these two samples are qualitatively similar 
to the full New York City sample.  Point estimates on the Harlem Gems range from -0.081 (1.140) to 
0.116 (0.185) for math and -0.080 (0.168) to 0.036 (0.138) for ELA.  Estimates for The Baby College 
range from -0.223  (0.156) to -0.049 (0.168) for math and -0.172 (0.148) to -0.108 (0.155) for ELA.
40 
None of the coefficients are statistically significant.  Taken at face value, our point estimates suggest that 
     
38 The Baby College and Harlem Gems began earlier than the Promise Academies, and as a result we have very few 
ntreated” cohorts to compare to.  “u
39 Using a student's address to calculate their block-group level income and adding this income as a covariate does 
t alter the results.  no
40 Results are qualitatively similar in all samples if school or teacher fixed effects are included.    23
                                             
neither Harlem Gems nor The Baby College positively impact math or reading scores. The estimates are 
so imprecise, however, that no definitive conclusions can be drawn.   
  The results from Table 7 are a bit surprising. An obvious explanation is that the effects of Harlem 
Gems and The Baby College, like many other early investments, fade by the time children are in third 
grade. To understand whether this is driving the meager results, Figures 8 and 9 show Iowa Test of Basic 
Skill test score trends for the 2005 Kindergarten Cohort separated by Harlem Gems and Baby College 
enrollment.  Panels A and B of Figure 8 show results for Harlem Gems.  We adjust scores for gender and 
free lunch and plot the predicted scores.
41  There are no observable differences in adjusted ITBS at any 
point between students who attended the Harlem Gems and those that did not.  Panels A and B of Figure 
9 repeat the analysis for The Baby College.  Similar to the Harlem Gems results, there are no observable 
differences in adjusted ITBS at any point students who attended The Baby College and those that did not. 
  To dig deeper into The Baby College results, we also examine the partial correlation between 
attending The Baby College and the Bracken School Readiness Assessment for the subset of children who 
attended the 2001-2007 cohorts of Harlem Gems.  The Bracken test was administered before students 
attended Gems (three years before the test outcomes in Table 7), and has been normalized to have mean 
zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 8 presents these results.  The raw correlation between 
attending The Baby College and Bracken Scores is 0.045 (0.111) standard deviations. Controlling for 
cohort effects, age in months, parental education and household income only makes the partial correlation 
of The Baby College on Bracken smaller. Accounting for all of our available controls, attending The 
Baby College is associated with a 0.009 ( 0.111) standard deviation gain in school readiness.
42  
   We fail to find any empirical evidence that Harlem Gems or The Baby College is positively 
associated with achievement. There are a few potential explanations.  Perhaps the most obvious is that 
Harlem Gems and The Baby College are simply not effective programs.  The Nurse-Family Partnership, 
one of the more successful early childhood programs with a parenting component, involves weekly visits 
from a registered nurse beginning in a mother’s first trimester.  These visits continue through a child’s 
second birthday (though less frequently as a child ages), with over 50 total visits before mothers exit the 
program.  In contrast, The Baby College uses paraprofessionals in a treatment that lasts only nine weeks. 
Second, our estimates are not causal and there may be thorny issues of selection that remain even after 
controlling for family demographics.
43  A final explanation is that assessments of academic achievement 
     
41 There is positive selection on observables into Harlem Gems.  As a result the unadjusted graphs follow the same 
nds, but with Harlem Gems scores somewhat higher at each grade than the non-Harlem Gems scores.  tre
42 Estimates from our main IV strategy using the interaction between a student’s address and cohort year also 
suggest that the impact of The Baby College on third-grade test scores is zero, but the results are sensitive to small 
specification changes and have a weak first stage. 
43 We find no evidence of negative selection into The Baby College or Harlem Gems based on observable 
characteristics.  Regressing an indicator for The Baby College or Harlem Gems enrollment on demographic   24
                                                                                                                                                            
may be the wrong outcomes to assess the effectiveness of an early education or parenting program. It is 
quite possible, for instance, that The Baby College is more likely to assist parents when kids are 
absorbing higher-order thinking and will help them engage with their children so they are less likely to 
engage in criminal activities, and so on. More definitive conclusions about the true impact of Harlem 
Gems and The Baby College will be better understood with the passage of time, broader data collection, 
and planned experimentation.   
    
V. Communities, Schools, or Both? 
  HCZ students are exposed to a web of community services along with education innovations 
ranging from a longer school day and year to after-school programs to mental and physical health 
services.  These programs fall into three broad categories: (1) community programs available to anyone in 
the 97 blocks that comprise the Zone; (2) student-family programs that are only available to HCZ students 
and their families, and (3) student programs that are only available to HCZ students.  Thus far, we have 
loosely referred to (1) as the community programs and (2) and (3) as school programs. Let us consider 
each bundle in turn.   
  The community services – community centers, the truancy-prevention programs, the network of 
targeted programs such as the asthma and obesity initiatives, The Baby College, Harlem Gems, and so on 
– are available to any child in HCZ.  These programs may plausibly affect student outcomes in any 
number of ways, from mitigating the physical and emotional barriers to success that typical urban 
students face, to providing a more supportive out-of-school learning environment. 
  Beyond The Baby College and Harlem Gems results, there are three pieces of evidence that 
suggest that the combined effect of the community bundle alone is not responsible for the gains in 
achievement. First, our main IV strategy compares children inside the Zone's boundaries relative to other 
children in the Zone that were ineligible for the lottery so the estimates are purged of the community 
bundle.  Recall, our IV estimates are larger than the lottery estimates, however, suggesting that 
communities alone are not the answer.  Second, in our analysis of subsamples, children inside the Zone 
garnered the same benefit from the schools as those outside the Zone, suggesting that proximity to the 
community programs is unimportant. Third, the Moving to Opportunity experiment, which relocated 
individuals from high-poverty to low-poverty neighborhoods while keeping the quality of schools roughly 
constant, showed null results for girls and negative results for boys (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006; Kling et 
 
characteristics and indicators for being eligible for free and reduced price lunch, we find that Harlem Gems enrollees 
are somewhat less likely to be eligible for free lunch than other students in the Kindergarten Lottery, the Zone, or 
New York as a whole, and Baby College enrollees are neither more or less likely to be eligible for free lunch than 
other students in the available samples. In the Harlem Gems sample, Baby College enrollees are, if anything, 
somewhat more advantaged, being more likely to have a parent that is college educated.    25
                                                
al., 2007).  This suggests that a better community, as measured by poverty rate, does not significantly 
raise test scores if school quality remains essentially unchanged.  Additionally, and far more speculative, 
there is substantial anecdotal evidence that the Children’s Zone program was unsuccessful in the years 
before opening the public charter schools.
44 Indeed, the impetus behind starting the schools was the lack 
of test-score growth under the community-only model.   
  The bundle of student-family services, such as the provision of nutritious fruits and vegetables, 
pre-made meals, money and travel allowances to ensure kids get to school, and general advice on how to 
support their child’s learning, are only available to HCZ students and their families. A simple test of this 
hypothesis is to compare outcomes of children in the HCZ Promise Academy public charter schools to 
their siblings who are in regular public schools. If the student-family services provide inputs to the entire 
family, the siblings of the charter-school students will benefit.  
We instrument a student’s enrollment status with her lottery number.
45  Under several 
assumptions (that the treatment-group assignment is random, lottery losers are not allowed to enroll, and 
winning the lottery only affects outcomes through charter-school enrollment) we can estimate the causal 
impact of a student enrolling in the public charter school on her sibling’s outcomes. We define siblings as 
any two students who share the same last name and address at any point in time. 
  Table 9 presents our primary sibling-peer results in the middle-school sample.
46  Each regression 
controls for the sibling’s pre-lottery outcomes, gender, race and lunch status.  The reported coefficient is 
an indicator for whether the student was enrolled in the HCZ Promise Academy in sixth grade, using that 
student’s lottery number as an instrument. Outcomes are for two years after a student was entered in the 
HCZ lottery, the most recent data we have available.
47  Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
48  
The sample is restricted to siblings that did not attend the HCZ Promise Academy themselves.  Results 
are qualitatively similar if all siblings are used. 
 
44In Whatever it Takes: Geoffrey Canada’s Quest to Change Harlem and America, Paul Tough writes, “A few years 
into the life of the Zone, Canada hit a snag.  The problem was the schools.  His original plan called for his staff to 
work closely with the principals of Harlem’s local public schools, providing them with supplemental services like 
computer labs and reading programs…To Canada’s surprise and displeasure, principals sometimes resisted the help, 
turning down his requests for classroom space or kicking out the tutors that the organization supplied.  Even in the 
schools where the programs were running smoothly, they didn’t seem to be producing results: the neighborhood’s 
ading and math scores had barely budged” (Tough, 2008).  re
45 The siblings sample is too small to execute our main instrumental variables strategy; the corresponding first stage 
is weak. The main IV results generally correspond to the results reported here, but are less precise and less robust to 
ecification changes.  sp
46 Most siblings of the HCZ elementary students do not have valid test scores (e.g. are too young) or are also 
enrolled in the HCZ schools.  We therefore concentrate our analysis on siblings of the middle-school cohort.   
47Results are qualitatively similar if we allow the effect of enrollment to vary by dosage and use outcomes from the 
same calendar year. 
48To address concerns that the subset of HCZ students with siblings may be different than the subset without 
siblings, we replicate our main results from Table 3 for both groups.  Students with and without siblings experience 
nearly identical gains to HCZ enrollment, and are quite similar on observable characteristics.   26
                                                
  The effect of a student’s enrollment in HCZ appears to be relatively small or even negative on her 
sibling’s test scores; siblings of charter-school students gain approximately 0.053 (0.337) standard 
deviations in math and lose 0.125 (0.275) standard deviations in ELA, but measured so imprecisely that 
we cannot make firm conclusions.
49  There is a large effect of a student’s enrollment on their sibling’s 
absences, with siblings missing 7.961 (5.062) fewer days on average, though the effect is statistically 
significant only at  the 10 percent level.  Taken at face value, this suggests that the student-family bundle 
of services may decrease absences, but there is no effect on achievement test scores.   
We have provided some evidence that HCZ’s success in raising test scores is unlikely to be 
driven by the bundle of community services, either directly or indirectly, and that the effects of the 
student-family programs on test-scores are, at best, modest. This suggests that either the HCZ Promise 
Academy public charter schools are the main driver of our results or the interaction of the schools and 
community investments is the impetus for such success.   
An important remaining question is why HCZ charters are so effective at educating the poorest 
minority students. With trepidation, we will hazard a guess. With the available data it is impossible to 
disentangle which particular school input is driving the results, but it is likely not teacher incentives alone  
(Fryer, 2009b), social workers alone (Kendziora et al., 2008), or student incentives alone (Fryer, 2009a). 
Each one of these initiatives may have a positive return on investment, but they are not likely to produce 
such dramatic results in isolation.
50  
HCZ teachers or administrators, who are partly rewarded based on student achievement in various 
ways, could be cheating. There have been documented cases of cheating in California (May, 1999), 
Massachusetts (Marcus, 2000), New York (Loughran and Comiskey, 1999), Texas (Kolker, 1999), Great 
Britain (Hofkins, 1995; Tysome, 1994) and Chicago (Jacob and Levitt, 2003).  Using an algorithm similar 
to Jacob and Levitt (2003), we implement two statistical tests of cheating at HCZ. First, we test whether 
HCZ students are more likely to have an unusual block of consecutive identical answers, and second we 
test whether HCZ students systematically underperform on easy questions while overperforming on hard 
questions.
51  We find that neither approach suggests that there is cheating at HCZ.  On 3
rd and 8
th grade 
ELA and Math for both cohorts (8 total measures), HCZ is between the 42
nd and 72
nd percentiles in the 
 
49 Comparing the standardized scores of students across grades imposes a number of functional form restrictions, so 
we also consider the effect of enrollment on a sibling’s percentile score rank.  Results are qualitatively similar, with 
int estimates small and not statistically significant.  po
50 There may also be important interactions between different elements of the HCZ school bundle. Analogous to the 
discovery of HAART that treats HIV/AIDS, each element of the bundle may not be effective individually but 
together one receives both the direct effect of the program and the interactions between elements of the bundle. 
51Jacob and Levitt (2003) also search for large, unexpected increases in test scores one year, followed by very small 
test score gains (or even declines) the following year.  Their identification strategy exploits the fact that these two 
types of indicators are very weakly correlated in classrooms unlikely to have cheated, but very highly correlated in 
situations where cheating likely occurred.  We cannot use this second measure, as administrative cheating at HCZ 
would imply large gains that are maintained as long as students attend.     27
                                             
“suspiciousness” of its answer strings.  Adjusting for school size to account for the number of strings we 
search over, HCZ is between the 43
rd and 60
th percentiles.  To test whether HCZ students answer “too 
many” hard questions correctly – a possible indication of cheating if teachers are changing those answers 
- we plot residuals from regression models predicting performance on each question in Appendix Figures 
2A through 2H.  Conditional on overall test performance, HCZ students appear no more likely to answer 
hard questions correctly than other students in the city.  Additional results and details are available in 
Appendix C. 
  It is plausible that high-quality teachers in the public charter schools are responsible for the 
results as the estimates are within the variance of teacher quality in Rockoff (2004), Hanushek and Rivkin 
(2005), Aaronson et al. (2007), and Kane and Staiger (2008), which range from 0.15 to 0.24 standard-
deviations in math and 0.15 to 0.20 in reading. Recall, in their quest to find high-quality teachers, the 
teacher-turnover rate at the HCZ charter was 48 percent in their first year.
52  
   Second, a linear combination of good policy choices can explain the results.
 In their analysis of 
New York City charter schools, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) estimate the relationship between a series of 
school policy choices (time on task, e.g.) and the success of the charter school. Plugging in HCZ’s 
combination of policies into the regression equation utilized in Hoxby and Murarka (2009) predicts yearly 
gains of 0.54 standard deviations, which would account for our results.
53 Indeed, this estimate is larger 
than any other charter school in their sample, suggesting that either HCZ has a unique blend of policies or 
the community investments serve as a vital technology shifter in the production of achievement.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The racial achievement gap in education is one of America’s most pressing social concerns. The 
typical black seventeen year-old reads at the proficiency level of the typical white thirteen year-old 
(Campbell et al., 2000). On the Scholastic Aptitude Test, the gateway to America’s institutions of higher 
     
52 The ideal test of this hypothesis would be to assign disadvantaged students to above average teachers in grades 6 
through 8.  Unfortunately, this rarely happens in practice.  In our data less than one percent of black students are 
consecutively assigned to 6
th, 7
th and 8
th grade teachers who have value added scores that are at least one standard 
viation above the mean.  de
53 We use the regression coefficients reported on page 59 of Hoxby and Muraka (2009) and HCZ survey responses 
to construct our estimate.  HCZ has the following characteristics (in order listed by Hoxby and Muraka, 2007, with 
associated regression coefficients in parentheses): has been operating for 4 years (-0.009), is a Charter Management 
Organization (-3.660), has 210 instructional days (0.021) and 8 instructional hours per day (-0.077), conducts 
Saturday school (0.153) and an optional after school program (0.058), uses a combination of original curriculum and 
the Core Knowledge curriculum (0.137/2 + 0.072/2), has an average class size of 20 (0.002), administers internal 
evaluations (-0.085), requires school uniforms (-0.179) and a dress code (0.139), does not have a broken windows 
disciplinary policy, does require a parent contract (-0.234) and reserve seats for parents on the board (0.233) and has 
one school leader (0.199).   28
                                             
learning, there is little overlap in the distribution of scores (Card and Rothstein, 2007). In the past 
decades, there has been very little progress in solving the achievement gap puzzle.  
HCZ is enormously successful at boosting achievement in math and ELA in elementary school 
and math in middle school. The impact of being offered admission into the HCZ middle school on ELA 
achievement is positive, but less dramatic. High-quality schools or community investments coupled with 
high-quality schools drive these results, but community investments alone cannot. 
As the Obama administration and other governments around the world decide whether and how to 
use the Harlem Children’s Zone model to combat urban poverty, costs is an important consideration. The 
New York Department of Education provided every charter school, including the Promise Academy, 
$12,443 per pupil in 2008-2009.  HCZ estimates that they added an additional $4,657 per-pupil for in-
school costs and approximately $2,172 per pupil for after-school and “wrap-around” programs.  This 
implies that HCZ spends $19,272 per pupil.  To put this in perspective, the median school district in New 
York State spent $16,171 per pupil in 2006, and the district at the 95
th percentile cutpoint spent $33,521 
per pupil (Zhou and Johnson, 2008). The total budget for the HCZ – including its community and school 
investments – is roughly $50 million per year.  
  Taken at face value, the achievement gains of HCZ students will translate into dramatically 
improved life trajectories. Our middle school lottery estimates – the most modest estimated - suggest a 
9.7 to 12.5 percent increase in earnings (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Currie and Thomas, 1999), a 2.8 to 3.7 
percent decrease in the probability of committing a property or violent crime (Levitt and Lochner, 2001), 
and a 12.5 to 18.8 decrease in the probability of having a health disability (Auld and Sidhu, 2005; Elias, 
2005; Kaestner, 2009).  If HCZ affects educational attainment as dramatically as achievement, the 
implied benefits are enormous (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Card, 
1999; Lantz et al., 1998; Card, 2001; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Pettit and Western, 2004; Lleras-
Muney, 2005; Belfield, 2006; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Rouse, 2006; Levin et al., 2007; 
Oreopoulos, 2007; Kaestner, 2009). The public benefits alone from converting a high school dropout to 
graduate are more than $250,000.
54  
We hope that our analysis provides a sense of optimism for work on the achievement gap. The 
HCZ model along with recent results in Abdulkadiroglu et. al. (2009) demonstrate that the right cocktail 
of investments can be successful. The challenge is to find even more efficient ways to achieve similar 
achievement gains in regular – non charter – public schools, so that all children, independent of their race 
or their parent's income, can receive a high quality education.  
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 Figure 1 
The Harlem Children’s Zone 
 
 






Notes:  In our elementary-school sample a student’s cohort is imputed from her initial kindergarten year.  
If we do not observe an elementary student in kindergarten, we impute the expected grade from the 
student’s birth date.  In our middle-school sample a student’s cohort is imputed from her initial sixth-
grade year.
1  If we do not observe a student in sixth grade, we impute an expected grade from the nearest 




th Avenue to 8
th Avenue.  Results are qualitatively similar if the Phase 2 or Phase 3 area is used. 
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Notes: Lottery winners are students who receive a winning lottery number or who are in the top ten of the 
waitlist.  Test scores are standardized by grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the entire 
New York City sample. The CCM is the estimated test score for those in the control group who would 
have complied if they had received a winning lottery number.    
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Notes: Sample is students who have non-missing test scores for all grades. We report National Percentile 
Rank scores, which are standardized to a national sample of students who are in the same grade and who 
were tested at the same time of year (fall or spring).   
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Summary Statistics of Lottery Sample 
 
   
Students in Lottery 
 
Students living in designated areas 
  K – 4  6 – 8  K – 4  6 – 8 




















  Male  0.522 0.528 0.907 0.516 0.438 0.095 0.511 0.522 0.509 0.512 
  White  0.000 0.006 0.313 0.005 0.003 0.723 0.038 0.163 0.022 0.13 
  Black  0.861 0.813 0.215 0.846 0.833 0.700 0.719 0.287 0.741 0.308 
  Hispanic  0.139 0.170 0.411 0.143 0.157 0.672 0.207 0.390 0.222 0.381 
  Free Lunch  0.678 0.688 0.844 0.714 0.666 0.266 0.694 0.620 0.657 0.651 
  Reduced Lunch  0.078 0.102 0.421 0.115 0.127 0.705 0.086 0.071 0.096 0.095 
  Treatment Received  0.594 0.238 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.001 0.019 0.000 
   5
th Grade Math   -- --  --  -0.246  -0.330  0.206  --  --  -0.425 0.004 
   5
th Grade ELA   -- --  --  -0.211  -0.297  0.245  --  --  -0.306 -0.003 
               
School characteristics               
  Male  0.507 0.509    0.503 0.499    0.505 0.520 0.516 0.511 
  White  0.025 0.039    0.017 0.038    0.044 0.161 0.080 0.132 
  Black  0.745 0.669    0.764 0.511    0.640 0.290 0.535 0.306 
  Hispanic  0.194 0.245    0.188 0.404    0.272 0.390 0.334 0.380 
  Free Lunch  0.68 0.685   0.682  0.677   0.685 0.622 0.627 0.647 
  Reduced Lunch  0.108 0.107    0.114 0.091    0.083 0.073 0.094 0.094 
  5
th Grade Math   -- --    -0.364  -0.257    -- --  -0.261 -0.009 
  5
th Grade ELA   -- --    -0.301  -0.243    -- --  -0.190 -0.018 
  Charter  0.644 0.534    0.685  0.158    0.241  0.032  0.137 0.022 
             
  Observations  173  157  178  290  761  388923  516 233912 
 
 
Notes:  HCZ refers to the original 24-block area of the Harlem Children’s Zone, ranging from 116
th to 123
rd Streets, 5
th Avenue to 8
th Avenue.  
NYC refers to the universe of New York City public-school students.  Lottery winners are students who receive a winning lottery number or who 








Middle-School Lottery Results 
 






Dependent  Variable    ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT 
6
th Grade Math Score  0.249*** 0.348*** 0.215*** 0.286*** 0.280*** 0.402*** 
  (0.053) (0.073) (0.069) (0.091) (0.085) (0.120) 
7
th Grade Math Score  0.275*** 0.394*** 0.269*** 0.372*** 0.278*** 0.406*** 
  (0.054) (0.076) (0.079) (0.109) (0.073) (0.101) 
8
th Grade Math Score  0.546*** 0.765*** 0.682*** 0.933*** 0.403*** 0.566*** 
  (0.076) (0.100) (0.103) (0.135) (0.103) (0.140) 
        
6
th Grade Math on Level  0.116*** 0.162*** 0.096  0.128  0.141**  0.203** 
  (0.043) (0.059) (0.059) (0.079) (0.061) (0.088) 
7
th Grade Math on Level  0.178*** 0.256*** 0.211*** 0.293*** 0.140**  0.204** 
  (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) (0.085) (0.060) (0.087) 
8
th Grade Math on Level  0.275*** 0.385*** 0.369*** 0.505*** 0.183*** 0.257*** 
  (0.043) (0.056) (0.059) (0.078) (0.065) (0.088) 
        
6
th Grade ELA Score  0.033 0.047 0.033 0.044 0.022 0.032 
  (0.053) (0.075) (0.074) (0.099) (0.079) (0.114) 
7
th Grade ELA Score  0.029  0.041 -0.018 -0.024  0.045  0.066 
  (0.050) (0.072) (0.071) (0.097) (0.074) (0.110) 
8
th Grade ELA Score  0.190*** 0.266*** 0.210*** 0.288*** 0.138*  0.192* 
  (0.058) (0.081) (0.080) (0.109) (0.079) (0.111) 
        
6
th Grade ELA on Level  0.029 0.040 0.057 0.077  -0.015  -0.022 
  (0.039) (0.055) (0.052) (0.071) (0.058) (0.084) 
7
th Grade ELA on Level  -0.019 -0.027 -0.024 -0.033 -0.042 -0.062 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.055) (0.076) (0.061) (0.091) 
8
th Grade ELA on Level  0.151*** 0.211*** 0.121**  0.166**  0.174*** 0.243*** 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.056) (0.077) (0.064) (0.091) 
        
6
th Grade Absences  -2.984*** -4.187*** -1.628*  -2.176*  -4.383*** -6.400*** 
  (0.704) (0.985) (0.976) (1.297) (0.990) (1.418) 
7
th Grade Absences  -2.202* -3.192* -4.067***  -5.618***  -0.758  -1.136 
  (1.290) (1.848) (1.507) (2.078) (1.919) (2.864) 
8
th Grade Absences  -3.960*** -5.563*** -7.629***  -10.431***  0.234  0.333 
  (1.323) (1.862) (2.100) (2.889) (2.080) (2.954) 
        
On-Time at 6
th  Grade  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        
On-Time at 7
th Grade  -0.004 -0.006 -0.027 -0.037  0.016  0.023 
  (0.023) (0.034) (0.040) (0.055) (0.025) (0.037) 
On-Time at 8
th Grade  0.006 0.009 0.010 0.014  -0.010  -0.014 
  (0.023) (0.032) (0.043) (0.059) (0.014) (0.020) 
          
Observations: Treated  178  178  83  83  95  95 
                       Control  289  289  167  167  122  122 
 
 
Notes:  Each regression controls for the gender, race, lunch status, and predetermined values of the 
dependent variable.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We cluster the standard errors at the 
individual level for the pooled regression as they inlcude students that applied in both 2005 and 2006.  
Regressions for the individual year samples are not clustered.  The regression is run for all students 
entered in the indicated HCZ lottery who have valid scores through 2008 - 2009.  Treatment is defined as   47
either having a winning lottery number or being high on the waitlist.  Test scores are standardized to have 
mean zero and standard deviation one by grade in the full New York City sample. 
*** = significant at 1% 
level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level.   48
 
Table 3 











th Grade Math Score  0.217  0.066  0.141 
  (0.568) (0.562) (0.501) 
7




  (0.405) (0.347) (0.299) 
8




  (0.236) (0.191) (0.153) 
     
6
th Grade Math on Level  -0.129  -0.192  -0.161 
  (0.123) (0.147) (0.128) 
7
th Grade Math on Level  -0.041  -0.120  -0.179 
  (0.331) (0.272) (0.223) 
8




  (0.127) (0.130) (0.124) 
     
6
th Grade ELA Score  -0.010  0.015  0.052 
  (0.402) (0.354) (0.311) 
7
th Grade ELA Score  0.209  0.249  0.318 
  (0.461) (0.408) (0.385) 
8
th Grade ELA Score  0.136  0.273  0.260 
  (0.303) (0.257) (0.254) 
     
6
th Grade ELA on Level  0.026  -0.012  0.018 
  (0.240) (0.233) (0.238) 
7
th Grade ELA on Level  -0.297  -0.307  -0.290 
  (0.213) (0.185) (0.181) 
8
th Grade ELA on Level  0.191  0.161  0.175 
  (0.217) (0.201) (0.201) 
     
6
th Grade Absences  -5.840
* -5.800
* -5.514 
  (2.322) (2.494) (2.996) 
7
th Grade Absences  -11.434
* -10.420
* -10.100 
  (4.723) (5.088) (5.574) 
8
th Grade Absences  -4.550  -4.393  -2.217 
  (3.918) (3.182) (2.534) 
     
On-Time at 6
th  Grade  -- -- -- 
     
On-Time at 7
th  Grade  0.069 0.013 0.001 
  (0.140) (0.127) (0.126) 
On-Time at 8
th  Grade  -0.115 -0.143 -0.100 
     
Observations 9155  19871  29228 
 
Notes:  Each regression controls for the gender, race, lunch status, predetermined values of the dependent 
variable (when available), and whether the student lives within the 24-block Children’s Zone. Enrollment 
in the HCZ charter school at sixth grade is the reported coefficient, which is instrumented for using 
interactions between the student’s cohort and whether she lives within the 24-block Children’s Zone. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the cohort level are reported in parentheses.  The sample is all 
students who live within the indicated distance of the Zone.  
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant 
at 5% level, 











Boys  Girls 
 
p-value 
   6th Grade Math Score  0.348*** 0.333*** 0.360*** 0.854 
  (0.073) (0.100) (0.105)   
   7th Grade Math Score  0.394*** 0.336*** 0.446*** 0.467 
  (0.076) (0.111) (0.103)   
   8th Grade Math Score  0.765*** 0.865*** 0.672*** 0.314 
  (0.100) (0.136) (0.141)   
      
   6th Grade ELA Score  0.047  -0.008 0.097 0.485 
  (0.075) (0.108) (0.104)   
   7th Grade ELA Score  0.041  -0.004 0.081 0.567 
  (0.072) (0.113) (0.094)   
   8th Grade ELA Score  0.266***  0.208** 0.320** 0.493 
  (0.081) (0.096) (0.130)   
      
   Observations  486  228  258   











   6th Grade Math Score  0.374
***  0.333*** 0.381*** 0.754 
 (0.078)  (0.088) (0.128)   
   7th Grade Math Score  0.423
***  0.441*** 0.287**  0.333 
 (0.081)  (0.091) (0.133)   
   8th Grade Math Score  0.827
***  0.793*** 0.704*** 0.646 
 (0.108)  (0.126) (0.153)   
      
   6th Grade ELA Score  0.050  0.048 0.045 0.984 
 (0.081)  (0.093) (0.126)   
   7th Grade ELA Score  0.044  -0.028 0.206 0.163 
 (0.076)  (0.083) (0.145)   
   8th Grade ELA Score  0.287
***  0.254*** 0.293*  0.837 
 (0.087)  (0.091) (0.165)   
      
   Observations  486  375  111   










   6th Grade Math Score  0.374
***  0.264** 0.385***  0.303 
 (0.078)  (0.109) (0.080)   
   7th Grade Math Score  0.423
***  0.342*** 0.418*** 0.549 
 (0.081)  (0.114) (0.087)   
   8th Grade Math Score  0.827
***  0.782*** 0.758*** 0.872 
 (0.108)  (0.139) (0.114)   
      
   6th Grade ELA Score  0.050  0.163 -0.005  0.193 
 (0.081)  (0.122) (0.081)   
   7th Grade ELA Score  0.044  0.159 -0.013  0.114 
 (0.076)  (0.098) (0.082)   
   8th Grade ELA Score  0.287
***  0.214** 0.289***  0.566 
 (0.087)  (0.104) (0.099)   
      
Observations  486 154 333   
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Notes:  Each regression controls for the gender, race, lunch status, and predetermined values of the 
dependent variable. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the student level are reported in 
parentheses. The regression is run for all students entered in the indicated HCZ lottery who have valid 
scores through 2008 - 2009.  The reported coefficient is the effect of being enrolled in the HCZ Promise 
Academy in sixth grade interacted with the defining subsample variable, instrumented for using treatment 
status interacted with the defining subsample variable.  Scores are standardized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one by grade in the full New York City sample. 
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = 
significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level.   
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Table 5 










   3
rd Grade Math Score  1.117  1.296
**  1.245
** 
 (0.581)  (0.417)  (0.405) 
     
   3
rd Grade Math on Level  0.556  0.631  0.535 
 (0.437)  (0.406)  (0.375) 
     
   3




 (0.601)  (0.489)  (0.521) 
     
   3




 (0.371)  (0.293)  (0.311) 
     
   4
th Grade Math Score  0.446  0.669
**  0.613
** 
 (0.242)  (0.197)  (0.224) 
     
   4




 (0.191)  (0.122)  (0.135) 
     
   4




 (0.418)  (0.376)  (0.366) 
     
   4




 (0.249)  (0.196)  (0.201) 
     
   1
st Grade Absences  -4.236  1.318  2.115 
 (9.324)  (7.741)  (8.878) 
   2
nd Grade Absences  -0.883  -4.633  -7.804 
 (5.992)  (4.923)  (4.432) 
   3
rd Grade Absences  4.583  -3.036  -4.537 
 (7.232)  (4.679)  (4.120) 
4
th Grade Absences  5.797  5.379
*  3.519 
 (4.180)  (2.660)  (2.834) 
     
   On-time at 1




 (0.137)  (0.100)  (0.082) 
   On-time at 2
nd Grade  -0.518  -0.433
*  -0.440
* 
 (0.283)  (0.194)  (0.208) 
   On-time at 3




 (0.226)  (0.197)  (0.241) 
On-time at 4




 (0.038)  (0.014)  (0.029) 
     
Observations 6156  13540  20138 
 
Notes:  Each regression controls for the gender, race, lunch status, predetermined values of the dependent 
variable (when available), and whether the student lives within the 24-block Children’s Zone.  Enrollment 
in the HCZ charter school at kindergarten is the reported coefficient, which is instrumented for using the 
interaction between the student’s cohort and whether she lives within the 24-block Children’s Zone. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the cohort level are reported in parentheses.  The sample is all 
students living within the indicated distance of the Zone.  
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 
5% level, 






Elementary-School Lottery Results 
 
Dependent Variable   Pooled   2004 Cohort  2005 Cohort 
3
rd Grade Math Score  0.644 0.823
** 0.470 
  (0.436) (0.375) (0.814) 
     
3
rd Grade Math on Level  0.152 0.148 0.147 
  (0.109) (0.110) (0.191) 
     
3
rd Grade ELA Score  0.994
** 0.844
** 1.254 
  (0.410) (0.349) (0.778) 
     
3
rd Grade ELA on Level  0.453
** 0.304  0.631
* 
  (0.208) (0.237) (0.350) 
     
4
th Grade Math Score    1.032
*  
   (0.569)   
     
4
th Grade Math on Level    0.437
*  
   (0.244)   
     
4
th Grade ELA Score    0.476   
   (0.514)   
     
4
th Grade ELA on Level    0.099   
   (0.289)   
     
1
st Grade Absences  -8.131
* -9.728  -7.168 
  (4.617) (5.994) (6.898) 
2
nd Grade Absences  -10.002
** -13.664
*** -6.105 
  (4.334) (4.550) (6.883) 
3
rd Grade Absences  -6.915 -7.505 -5.237 
  (4.486) (4.559) (7.663) 
4
th Grade Absences    -4.539   
   (9.444)   
     
On-time at 1
st Grade  0.085 0.063 0.081 
  (0.067) (0.070) (0.110) 
On-time at 2
nd Grade  0.229
* 0.106  0.332 
  (0.128) (0.099) (0.244) 
On-time at 3
rd Grade  0.211
* 0.326
* 0.075 
  (0.113) (0.173) (0.118) 
On-time at 4
th Grade    0.326
*  
   (0.173)   
     
Observations  323 107  216 
 
 
Notes: Each regression controls for the gender, race, and lunch status.  Enrollment in the HCZ charter 
school at kindergarten is the reported coefficient, which is instrumented for using the student's position in 
the lottery and waitlist.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the cohort level are reported in 
parentheses.  The sample is all students entered in the HCZ lottery in the indicated year.  Test scores are 
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade in the full New York City sample. 
*** 
= significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level. 
 Table 7 
Harlem Gems and Baby College Results  
 
Panel A - All Students in NYC 
 
 
Math Score in 3
rd Grade 
 
ELA Score in 3
rd Grade 
 





Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 













  (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (1.003) (1.017)  (1.019) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.034) 
                
Harlem Gems   -0.066  -0.047   -0.019  -0.008   -0.993  -1.336    0.006  -0.001 
   (0.133)  (0.137)   (0.132)  (0.135)   (1.487)  (1.523)   (0.049)  (0.050) 
                
Baby College     -0.057     -0.033    1.039     0.021 
     (0.091)     (0.091)     (1.000)     (0.033) 
                
Observations  139585 139585 139585 136835 136835 136835 142793  142793  142793 143103 143103 143103 
 
Panel B - Students Living Close to or in the Harlem Children Zone 
 
 
Math Score in 3
rd Grade 
 
ELA Score in 3
rd Grade 
 





Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 










  (0.156) (0.161) (0.162) (0.147) (0.152) (0.152) (1.983) (2.046) (2.057)  (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) 
               
Harlem Gems    0.044  0.116    -0.080 -0.025    -1.135 -1.588    -0.037 -0.025 
   (0.179)  (0.185)   (0.168)  (0.174)   (2.265)  (2.350)   (0.077)  (0.080) 
               
Baby College      -0.223     -0.172     1.413     -0.039 
     (0.156)     (0.148)     (1.950)     (0.066) 
               
Observations  2809 2809 2809 2749 2749 2749 2883 2883  2883  2894 2894 2894 
 
Panel C - Kindergarten Lottery Sample 
   
Math Score in 3
rd Grade 
 
ELA Score in 3
rd Grade 
 





Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 









** -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
  (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (1.130) (1.135) (1.136)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
               
Harlem Gems   -0.081  -0.066    0.003  0.036   -1.474  -2.043    0.026  0.014 
   (0.140)  (0.150)   (0.129)  (0.138)   (1.389)  (1.479)   (0.033)  (0.035) 
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Baby College     -0.049     -0.108     1.856     0.039 
     (0.168)     (0.155)     (1.663)     (0.040) 
               
Observations  322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322  322  322 322 322 
 
 
Notes: Each regression controls for the gender, race, and lunch status of the student. Columns (1) – (3) use 3
rd grade math score as the dependent 
variable.  Columns (4) – (6) use ELA score. Columns (7) – (9) use total absences in 3
rd grade, and columns (10) – (12) use a student’s on-time 
status at 3
rd grade. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade in the full New York City sample. 
*** = 
significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level.   55
Table 8 














Baby  College  0.045 0.028 0.034 0.005 0.009 
  (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
Controls  for       
  Gender  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Race  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Age  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Parent's Education  No  No  No  Yes Yes 
  Parent's Income  No  No  No  No  Yes 
       
Observations  451 451 451 451 451 
 
Notes: The sample is made up of all students ever enrolled in the original Harlem Gems program, the 
Uptown Harlem Gems Program, or the Head Start Gems Program, between 2001-02 and 2007-08.  Note 
that after the 2005-06 school year, the original Harlem Gems program became part of the HCZ Promise 
Academies.  The dependent variable for all regressions is the Bracken scale test score, which is 
administered before the Harlem Gems begins. Scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one. The omitted race category is non-black, which make up less than 15 percent of the sample 
and is comprised mostly of Hispanics and African students.  The omitted parent income is less than 
$10,000 per year.  The omitted education category is less than a high school diploma.  
*** = significant at 
1% level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 














Siblings Results in the Middle-School Lottery Sample 
 
 
Dependent Variable  
 
 
   Math Score#  0.053 
 (0.337) 
      
   ELA Score#  -0.125 
 (0.275) 
    
   Absences  -7.961
* 
 (5.062) 
   
   On-time  -0.093 
 (0.075) 
   
   Observations  280 
 
Notes:  Each regression controls for sibling gender, race, lunch status, predetermined values of the 
dependent variable. The reported coefficient is an indicator for whether lottery student was enrolled at the 
HCZ Promise Academy Middle School in sixth grade, instrumented for using the lottery student's lottery 
status.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the family level are reported in parentheses.  Sample is 
restricted to those siblings that did not attend the HCZ Promise Academy themselves.  Results are 
qualitatively similar if all siblings are used.  Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one by grade in the full New York City sample 
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 
5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level. #Test score data are only available for grades 3 – 8, limiting the 





















 Appendix Figure 1 




Notes:  HCZ refers to the original 24-block Children’s Zone. Circles correspond to the distance in meters 
from the nearest border of the original Children's Zone.  Poverty rates by  block group are from the 2000 
Public Use Census data. 
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Appendix Figures 2A through 2H 









Notes:  Each regression controls for gender, race, lunch status, and test score. The dependent variable is 
whether a student answered a specific exam question correctly. We estimate this model for each question 
and separately by grade, subject and year. We then construct the unexplained residual for each student on 
each item, and sum the residuals for each item.  These summed residuals are plotted above, with the 
questions ordered from easiest (most students answering correctly) to hardest (fewest students answering 
correctly). 
 *** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 10% level.    60
 
Appendix Table 1 








2001 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0006
** -- 
 (0.000)   
2002 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0009
** -0.0004 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2003 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0009
** 0.0042
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2004 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0566
*** 0.1225
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2005 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0226
*** 0.0511
*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000) 
2006 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0141
*** 0.0282
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2007 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0276
*** -0.0004 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2008 Cohort x Zone Interaction  0.0339
*** -0.0003 
 (0.001)  (0.000) 
    
Select Control Variables     
Living in the Zone  -0.0065
** -0.0022
* 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
    
2001 Cohort Dummy  -0.0005
** -- 
 (0.000)   
2002 Cohort Dummy  -0.0008
** 0.0000
** 
 (0.000)  0.000   
2003 Cohort Dummy  -0.0001  0.0003
*** 
 (0.000)  0.000   
2004 Cohort Dummy  0.0117
*** 0.0131
*** 
 (0.000)  0.000   
2005 Cohort Dummy  0.0135
*** 0.0130
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2006 Cohort Dummy  0.0166
*** 0.0077
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
2007 Cohort Dummy  0.0121
*** 0.0002 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Constant -0.0023  -0.0038
** 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
    
Observations 35218  35790 
    
F-test on instruments (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
 
Notes:  Each regression controls also for the gender, race, and lunch status of the student.  Both samples 
include all students in the relevant cohorts that live within 1600 meters of the Zone.  The dependent 
variable is enrollment at the HCZ charter school.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the cohort 
level are in parentheses.  Results are comparable for other distances, and if other control variables are 
included.  Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level. 
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 
5% level, 




Appendix Table 2 
Sensitivity of Middle-School Lottery Results 
 






Dependent Variable   ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT 
6







  (0.059) (0.086) (0.071) (0.106) (0.085) (0.125) 
7







  (0.071) (0.108) (0.084) (0.128) (0.073) (0.103) 
8







  (0.116) (0.156) (0.120) (0.168) (0.107) (0.150) 
        
6
th Grade ELA Score  -0.008  -0.013 -0.027 -0.044  0.022  0.033 
  (0.064) (0.101) (0.079) (0.126) (0.079) (0.118) 
7
th Grade ELA Score  0.014  0.021 -0.04  -0.06  0.043  0.065 
  (0.051) (0.077) (0.069) (0.104) (0.075) (0.112) 
8







  (0.060) (0.093) (0.078) (0.128) (0.078) (0.113) 
        
Observations: Treated  177  177  82  82  95  95 
                       Control  306  306  173  173  133  133 
 
Notes: This table explores the sensitivity of our results to the difference in match rates between the 
Middle School lottery winners and losers by creating pseudo-lottery losers to equalize the match rates for 
each cohort.  These pseudo-students are assigned the highest test score observed in the control group for 
that year (about two standard deviations above the mean).  The number of observations refers to the 
number of real, not pseudo students.  Each regression controls for the gender, race, lunch status, and 
predetermined values of the dependent variable. Treatment is defined as either having a winning lottery 
number or being high on the waitlist.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the student level are in 
parentheses.  Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade in the 
full New York City sample. 
*** = significant at 1% level, 
** = significant at 5% level, 
* = significant at 
10% level.   Appendix Table 3 
Summary Statistics of IV Sample 
 
  Elementary School Sample  Middle School Sample 























    Male  0.516  0.522  0.519  0.526 0.028  0.513  0.496 0.517 0.521 0.021 
       (0.016)        (0.017) 
    White  0.031  0.032  0.161  0.171  -0.018
*** 0.016 0.021  0.150  0.149 -0.006 
       (0.005)        (0.006) 
    Black  0.696  0.688  0.304  0.309  -0.032
*  0.754  0.750 0.310 0.327 0.020 
       (0.017)        (0.016) 
    Hispanic  0.236  0.241  0.377  0.371 0.029  0.216  0.199 0.372 0.382 0.027 
       (0.016)        (0.032) 
    Free Lunch  0.609  0.595  0.625 0.535 0.026  0.627  0.634 0.577 0.584 0.000 
       (0.030)        (0.022) 
    Reduced Lunch  0.081  0.079  0.090 0.070 0.013  0.132  0.091 0.089 0.084 0.036
** 
       (0.011)        (0.013) 
    5
th Grade Math   --  --  --  --  --  -0.381  -0.465  0.025  -0.045  0.014 
               (0.096) 
    5
th Grade ELA   --  --  --  --  --  -0.316  -0.289  0.020  -0.041  -0.088 
              (0.057) 
              
    Observations  4649  4649  379555  1228051  --  491  916  302510  501962  -- 
 
Notes:  In the Zone refers to the original 24-block area of the Harlem Children’s Zone, ranging from 116
th to 123
rd Streets, 5
th Avenue to 8
th 
Avenue.  Out of the Zone refers to all addresses within 1600 meters of the original Zone.  Columns 5 and 10 have p-values from a test of equality 









Early Childhood Programs 
  The Baby College offers nine-week parenting workshops to expectant parents and those raising a 
  child up to three years old. 
 
  The Three Year Old Journey works with parents of children who have won the HCZ Promise 
Academy charter school lottery. Held on Saturdays over several months, it teaches parents about 
their child's development, building language skills and parenting skills. 
 
Get Ready for Pre-K involves children in small and large group activities that are designed to 
increase socialization skills, build routines, and provide exposure to their first classroom 
experience. The program has a particular focus on the development of pre-literacy skills. In order 
to prepare children for September entry into Harlem Gems Universal Pre-K or Head Start, four-
year-old children attend Get Ready for Pre-K from 8 AM to 6 PM every day for six weeks during 
the preceding summer.  
 
Harlem Gems Universal Pre-K is an all-day pre-kindergarten program that gets children ready to 
enter kindergarten. Classes have a 4:1 child-to-adult ratio, teach English, Spanish and French, and 
run from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. HCZ runs three pre-kindergarten sites, serving over 250 children. 
 
The Harlem Gems Head Start follows the same model as the Universal Pre-K but has a few 
important differences: 1) children can enter the Head Start at three or four years of age, thus a 
sizable proportion of the participants receive two years of instruction in the program, (2) because 
of income guidelines, students in Head Start tend to come from families with lower 
socioeconomic status than that of Universal Pre-K participants, and (3) while lead teachers at the 
UPK have master’s degrees, Head Start teachers have bachelor’s degrees. 
 
Public Elementary School Programs 
  Harlem Peacemakers funded in part by AmeriCorps, trains young people who are committed to 
  making their neighborhoods safe for children and families. The agency has Peacemakers working 
  as teaching assistants in seven public schools and the HCZ Promise Academy Charter School. 
 
Public Middle School Programs 
The TRUCE Fitness and Nutrition Center offers free classes to children in karate, fitness and 
dance. Participants also learn about health and nutrition, as well as receiving regular academic 
assistance. The program is focused on developing middle-school youth, grades 5-8. 
 
A Cut Above is an after-school program that helps students in the critical-but-difficult middle-
school years. Supporting students who are not in the HCZ Promise Academy charter school, it 
provides academic help, leadership development, as well as high-school and college preparation. 
 
Public High School Programs 
TRUCE Arts & Media (The Renaissance University for Community Education) does youth 
development through the arts and media, working with youth in grades 9-12 on academic growth, 
career readiness as well as fostering media literacy and artistic ability. 
 
 The  Employment and Technology center teaches computer and job-related skills to teens and 
 adults.   64
 
  Learn to Earn is an after-school program that helps high-school juniors and seniors improve their 




 The  College Success Office supports students who have graduated from high school and HCZ 
  programs. It helps them get into the most appropriate college, then assists them throughout their 
 college  years. 
 
Family, Community and Health Programs 
  Community Pride organizes tenant and block associations, helping many hundreds of tenants 
  convert their city-owned buildings into tenant-owned co-ops. 
 
  Single Stop offers access to a wide variety of services - from counseling to financial advice to 
  legal consultations - at several locations each week. 
 
 The  HCZ Asthma Initiative works closely with asthmatic children and their families so they can 
  learn to manage the disease and lessen its effects. 
 
 The  Healthy Living Initiative (formerly the Obesity Initiative) is a multi-pronged program to help 
  children and their families reverse the alarming trend toward obesity and its health effects. 
 
 
The Beacon Center Program  
 The  Beacon programs turn school buildings into community centers, offering programs during 
the afternoon, evening and weekend. They offer programs for youth and  adults from education to 
the arts to recreation. Each summer, they offer all-day camp so children have a safe, enriching 
place to spend their time instead of hanging out on the street. 
  
Foster Care Prevention Services 
  The HCZ Foster Care Prevention programs work to stabilize and strengthen families so that their 
children are not placed in foster care.  They include: 
 
 The  Family Development Program, which serves 120 families and specializes in access to 
mental-health professionals who collaborate with caseworkers to support therapeutic 
interventions. 
 
The  Family Support Center, which serves 90 families, and specializes in providing crisis-
intervention services, referrals, advocacy, as well as groups on parenting and anger management. 
 
The Midtown Family Place, which has 45 families and is based in Hell’s Kitchen.  It provides 
counseling, referrals and advocacy, as well as an after-school and summer program for children 
ages 5-12, a literacy program, and a food pantry. 
 
Project CLASS (Clean Living and Staying Sober), which serves as many as 50 families.  It 
specializes in providing referrals to drug- and alcohol-abuse programs, as well as creating, 
implementing and monitoring drug- treatment service plans. It also includes the Babies Initiative, 
which is offered to 20 families with children ages five and under who are at immediate risk of 
being put in foster care. This intensive program works to get family members whatever services 
they need in order to stabilize.   65
 
Truancy-Prevention, which has 90 families with at-risk children, and conducts groups on 






HCZ Promise Academy Charter Schools 
Now in its fifth year, HCZ Promise Academy 1 provides a comprehensive college-preparatory 
educational program, with an extended school day and school year. HCZ Promise Academy 2 is 
in its fourth year.  Both HCZ Promise Academy and HCZ Promise Academy 2 will eventually 
serve children from kindergarten through twelfth grade, bringing a strong focus on literacy and 
mathematics (over two hours of literacy instruction and over 90 minutes of mathematics 
instruction each day) within a safe, structured and personalized environment.  Each of the 
academies will be divided into four smaller “schools” (primary, elementary, middle, and high 
school) that will emphasize personalized relationships between students, teachers and families.  
 
The academic day runs from 8 AM until 4 PM, approximately 20 percent longer than the vast 
majority of surrounding traditional public schools. Students also have the opportunity to 
participate in after-school programming from 4 PM – 6 PM. The academic year consists of 210 
days of school, an increase over the 180 days required by law, which includes a 25-day 
mandatory summer program. 
 
In 2006, a health clinic opened in the HCZ Promise Academy 1 middle-school building so the 
students could get free medical, dental and mental-health services. The Harlem Children’s Health 
Project is a partnership of the Children’s Health Fund, the Mailman School of Public Health at 
Columbia University, New York-Presbyterian Hospital and HCZ. In addition, the clinic works 





Appendix B: Variable Construction 
 
Attendance 
We use a student’s annual total number of absences as reported by the New York Department of 
Education (NYCDOE), as a metric for student attendance. The NYCDOE collects student-level 
attendance data on a monthly basis, which we collapse for a total of an academic year (September-June). 
Duplicate values for students across a given month were included if the duplicate was from a different 
school, to incorporate students who changed schools mid-month. However, all duplicates across student 
ID, school ID, and month were dropped from the dataset. 
 
Close to HCZ 
We define those students who reside within 400 meters of the Zone’s border and within the zone itself to 
be “Close to HCZ.”  
 
Cohort Group 
We impute a student’s cohort group by her initial kindergarten or sixth-grade year for students in the 
elementary-school and middle-school sample, respectively. If we do not observe a student in 
kindergarten, we impute her kindergarten cohort using her expected grade, which compares her date of 
birth with state-mandated entry dates. If we do not observe a student in sixth grade, we impute her sixth 
grade cohort using the first time we observe her in the years above or below sixth grade, from fourth to 
eighth. If we still cannot impute her sixth grade cohort, we follow the same methodology as with the 
kindergarten sample, and use her expected grade to determine her cohort. 
 
Age 
Using data provided by the HCZ for the Harlem Gems sample, we control for student age, in months in 
the Harlem Gems regressions. 
 
Distance to the Zone 
Using the ArcGIS geocoding utility, we gecode and chart student home addresses provided by the 
NYCDOE. We then calculate each addresses’ distance to the nearest boundary of the Harlem Children’s 
Zone using the near function in ArcGIS to calculate the distance from each point to the zone itself. We 
then identify those addresses within the zone using the ArcGIS select by location function, flagged them 
as inside the zone, and set their respective distances equal to zero. We then manually adjust our definition 
of the zone to include those students residing within 10 meters of the zone’s boundary. The zone we 
consider includes the original Phase 1 of the zone, which encompasses the area from 116
th street to 123
rd 
street between 5
th Avenue and 8
th Avenue.  
 
Lottery Treatment 
Students in the lottery sample are considered a part of the “treatment” if they receive a winning lottery 
number or are placed high enough on the waitlist to be offered admission to the charter school. For the 
2004 kindergarten lottery, the first ten students on the waitlist were considered a part of the treatment 
group. For the 2005 cohort, the first 18 and ten students on the waitlist are considered a part of the 
treatment group for kindergarten and middle school lotteries, respectively.  For the 2006 middle school 
lottery, the first eight students on the waitlist were added to the treatment group. For the 2005 
kindergarten lottery, we only consider the Promise Academy 1 lottery. 
 
Lunch Status 
As provided by the NYCDOE, students are defined as being eligible for free lunch, reduced-price lunch, 




To determine whether a student is at or above grade level we first create a variable that identifies a 
student’s expected grade level. For the elementary school cohort, we generate a student’s expected grade 
by comparing her date of birth with the state-mandated school entry dates for each academic year. For the 
middle school cohort, we use the first year that the student was enrolled in fifth grade to compute 
expected grade. In both cases, we compare the student’s expected grade with her reported grade level, 
defining a student as “on time” if her reported grade level is at or above her expected grade. We pool 
those students in kindergarten or pre-kindergarten, giving each student in either grade a value of zero for 
her reported grade level. 
 
Race 
While the dataset contains a number of race variables and we generate variables for all available races 
(Black, White, Hispanic, Asian, and Multi –Race) we define students as being Black Hispanic or Other 
(which includes missing values) in our regression. As with lunch status, we use the most recent data 
available from the NYCDOE to create this variable 
 
Siblings 
Sibling groups were formed using reported last names and address data for each year as provided by the 
NYCDOE’s enrollment files.  
 
Test Scores 
Math and ELA test scores and test grade level are reported by the NYCDOE. Test scores are standardized 
across each grade and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. If a student is tested 
across multiple years for a given grade, she is assigned the standardized score from the first year that she 
is tested in that grade. Student percentiles for each test in each year were also generated using a student’s 





                                                
Appendix C: Statistical Tests of Cheating of at HCZ 
 
  This appendix investigates whether teacher or administrator cheating drives our results.  
  There have been documented cases of cheating in California (May, 1999), Massachusetts 
(Marcus, 2000), New York (Loughran and Comiskey, 1999), Texas (Kolker, 1999), Great Britain 
(Hofkins, 1995; Tysome, 1994) and Chicago (Jacob and Levitt, 2003).  While these studies generally rely 
examination of erasure patterns and the controlled retesting of students, Jacob and Levitt (2003) develop a 
new method for statistically detecting cheating.  Their approach is guided by the intuition that teacher 
cheating, especially if done in an unsophisticated manner, is likely to leave blocks of identical answers, 
unusual patterns of correlations across student answers within the classroom, or unusual response patterns 
within a student’s exam. 
  Following Jacob and Levitt’s (2003) algorithm, we use two strategies to investigate the possibility 
of cheating at HCZ.  First, we examine blocks of consecutive questions to see if HCZ students are more 
likely to have an unusual string of identical answers.  Second, we examine the performance of HCZ 
students on both “easy” and “hard” questions.  If students at HCZ systematically miss the easy questions 
while correctly answering the hard questions, this may be an indication of cheating.
55  
  We should note that there are more subtle ways teachers can cheat, such as by providing extra 
time to students or changing answers in a random way, that our algorithm is unlikely to detect.  Even 
when cheating is done naively our approach is not likely to detect every instance of cheating (see Jacob 
and Levitt (2003) for details and calibration exercises).  Our results should be interpreted with these 
caveats in mind. 
 
Suspicious Answer Strings 
  The quickest and easiest way for a teacher to cheat is to change the same block of consecutive 
questions for a subset of students in his or her class.  In this section we compare the most unlikely block 
of identical answers given on consecutive questions at HCZ to the most unlikely block of answers at other 
New York City schools.  
  To find the most unlikely string of answers we first predict the likelihood that each student will 
give the answer they did on each question using a multinomial logit. We estimate this model separately 
for each question in grade, subject and year, controlling for test score performance in that year and 
 
55Jacob and Levitt (2003) also search for large, unexpected increases in test scores one year, followed by very small 
test score gains (or even declines) the following year.  Their identification strategy exploits the fact that these two 
types of indicators are very weakly correlated in classrooms unlikely to have cheated, but very highly correlated in 
situations where cheating likely occurred.  We cannot use this second measure, as administrative cheating at HCZ 
would imply large gains that are maintained as long as students attend.     69
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background characteristics such as gender and free lunch eligibility.
5657   A student’s predicted 
probability of choosing any particular response is therefore identified by the likelihood that other stude
(in the same year, grade and subject) with similar background characteristics and test scores choos
response.            
  Using the estimates from this model, we calculate the predicted probability that each student 
would answer each item in the way that he or she in fact did.  This provides us with one measure per 
student per item.  Taking the product over items within each student, we calculate the probability that a 
student would have answered a string of consecutive questions from item m to item n as he or she did.  
We then take the product across all students in the classroom who had identical responses in the string.  
We repeat this calculation for all possible consecutive strings of length three to seven, and take the 
minimum of the predicted block probability for each school.  This measure captures the least likely block 
of identical answers given on consecutive questions in the school. 
  The results of this procedure show that HCZ students are no more likely to have a suspicious 
block of answers than students at other New York City schools.  On the 3
rd and 8
th grade ELA and Math 
exams (calculated separately for each cohort), HCZ’s most suspicious answer string is between the 42
nd 
and 72
nd percentiles.  Adjusting for school size to account for the number of strings we search over, HCZ 




Performance by Question Difficulty 
  The typical student will answer most of the easy questions correctly but get most of the hard 
questions wrong (where “easy” and “hard” are based on how well students of similar ability do on the 
question). If students in a school systematically miss easy questions while correctly answering hard 
questions, this may be an indication of cheating. Our second test therefore examines the performance of 
HCZ students on easy and hard exam questions. 
  To find the likelihood that each student will get an question correct we estimate a logit for each 
item on the exam. We estimate this model separately for each grade, subject and year and control for test 
score performance in that year and background characteristics such as gender and free lunch eligibility. 
We then construct the residual for each student on each item and sum the residuals by item for each 
     
56 This procedure implicitly assumes that a given student’s answers are conditionally uncorrelated across questions 
on the exam, and that answers are uncorrelated across students. While this assumption is unlikely to be true in 
practice, because all of our comparisons rely on the relative unusualness of the answers given in different schools, 
this simplifying assumption is not likely to bias our results unless the correlation within and across students varies 
 school.  by
57 By estimating the probability of selecting each possible response, rather than simply estimating the probability of 
choosing the correct response, we take advantage of any additional information that is provided by particular 
response patterns in a classroom.    70
school. If students do relatively better (worse) on a question than expected, the residual will be positive 
(negative). If students at a school do as well on an item as their total score and background would predict, 
the residual will be around zero. 
  In Appendix Figures 2A – 2H we plot residuals for HCZ students and for students citywide.  We 
order the questions from easiest to hardest (as determined by the percentage of students who answered 
that question correctly).  If HCZ students are systematically cheating on hard questions, we would expect 
them to underperform on easy questions (to have lower residuals than the rest of the city) and to 
overperform on hard questions (to have higher residuals than the rest of the city).  We find no evidence of 
this type of cheating.  Residuals for HCZ students follow the same general pattern as other schools in 
New York City, and there is no clear evidence of “over-performance” on hard questions.   71
                                             
Appendix D: Cost-Benefit Calculation 
 
  This appendix describes the assumptions underlying our cost-benefit calculation. 
 
Costs 
  The total per-pupil costs of the HCZ public charter schools can be calculated with relative ease.  
The New York Department of Education provided every charter school, including the Promise Academy, 
$12,443 per pupil in 2008-2009.  HCZ estimates that they added an additional $4,657 per-pupil for in-
school costs and approximately $2,172 per pupil for after-school and “wrap-around” programs.  This 
implies that HCZ spends $19,272 per pupil.  To put this in perspective, the median school district in New 
York State spent $16,171 per pupil in 2006, and the district at the 95
th percentile cutpoint spent $33,521 
per pupil (Zhou and Johnson, 2008). 
 
Benefits of Achievement 
  There are relatively few studies relating test scores to later life outcomes. Currie and Thomas 
(1999) find that a one standard deviation increase in reading scores at age seven is associated with an 8.0 
percent increase in wages at 33, and a one standard deviation increase in math scores is associated with 
7.8 percent higher wages.  Using our middle school lottery estimates from Table 2 - 0.827 in math and 
0.427 in ELA - suggests a (0.827*7.6 + 0.427*8.0) = 9.7 percent increase in wages for HCZ students.  
Neal and Johnson (1996) find that a one standard deviation increase in AFQT scores at ages 15 – 18 is 
associated with a 20 percent increase in wages at ages 26 to 29.  Taking an average of the estimated HCZ 
effect across math and reading, this corresponds to a (0.627 * 0.2) = 12.5 percent increase in wages.
58  
Levitt and Lochner (2001) find that a one quartile increase in AFQT scores is associated with a 3 to 4 
percent decrease in self-reported property and violent crime participation.  Assuming normality and using 
the average effect across both math and reading, this implies a (0.627/0.67) * (3 to 4) = 2.8 to 3.7 percent 
decrease in criminal participation.  Auld and Sidhu (2005) find that a one standard deviation increase in 
AFQT scores is associated with a 20 to 30 percent decrease in the probability of reporting a health 
limitation, implying a (0.627) * (20 to 30) = 12.5 to 18.8 percent decrease for HCZ students. Elias (2005) 
and Kaestner (2009) report similar findings using self-reported health status.   
     
58 Kruger (2003) suggests three reasons why Neal and Johnson (1996) find a larger effect of test scores on wages 
than Currie and Thomas (1996).  First, students were older when they took the AFQT exam, and there is evidence of 
mean regression in test scores.  Second, Currie and Thomas simultaneously enter the highly correlated reading and 
mathematics scores in the wage regression, whereas Neal and Johnson (1996) use just a single test score.  Finally, 
the British and American labour markets are different in ways that may change the correlation between test scores 
and wages.   72
  The above calculations assume that the relationship between test scores and future wages is 
causal.  We can also calculate the future benefit of HCZ using the rule of thumb that a one standard 
deviation increase in test scores is approximately equal to an additional year of schooling.  Under this 
scenario (and assuming that there are no signaling effects of education), our middle estimates suggest a 
4.7 to 6.7 percent increase in earnings (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999), a 0.23 percent decrease 
in the probability of incarceration (Lochner and Moretti, 2004), a 2.6 percent reduction in 10-year 
mortality (Lleras-Muney, 2005) and a 2.9 percent lower probability of having a teen birth (Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes, 2004). 
    
A
   If HCZ affects educational attainment as dramatically as achievement, the implied benefits are 
enormous (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Card, 1999; Lantz et al., 1998; 
Card, 2001; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Pettit and Western, 2004; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Belfield, 2006; 
Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Rouse, 2006; Levin et al., 2007; Oreopoulos, 2007; Kaestner, 2009). The 
public benefits alone would more than justify the costs. Using 2003 and 2004 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data and the NBER TAXSIM, Rouse (2006) finds that present value lifetime earnings at age 20 of 
black male high school dropouts are $292,200 versus $601,800 for high school graduates--this means that 
the average black male dropout contributes $118,000 in income taxes over his lifetime versus $222,400 
for a high school graduate. Accounting for property and sales taxes increases these figures by 5 percent. 
Overall, each additional black male high school graduate would produce a present value at age 20 of 
$167,600 in additional tax revenue. Using data from the 2002 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
combined with enrollment costs from the National Health Accounts (NHA), Levin et al. (2007) estimate 
that over the lifetime, each additional high school graduate would result in savings in public health costs 
with a net present value of $33,500 at age 20. Using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics as well as 
FBI Uniform Crime Rate data, Belfield (2006) estimates that converting a black male high school dropout 
to a graduate is associated with criminal justice cost savings of $55,500. Taken together, this implies a 
public benefit of approximately $256,700 per new high school graduate. 
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